Gerakan Sosial Niekekerasan

GERAKAN SOSIAL NIRKEKERASAN
Studi Kasus tentang Aksi Mogok Massal di Inggris Menentang Kedatangan George W. Bush

Menyikapi Kekerasan Sebagai Strategi Menuju Damai
Sepanjang perjalanan sejarah, kekerasan dan tindakan destruktif lainnya telah menjadi fenomena yang hegemonik dan umumnya ada di hampir setiap ranah kehidupan manusia. Kenyataan bahwa orang cenderung bertindak dengan kekerasan selalu menjadi perdebatan sengit yang tak pernah usai, dan tanpa disadari telah menjadi budaya, yang anehnya juga sering ditutup-tutupi. Di mana-mana setiap terjadi konflik, penyelesaian yang dianggap manjur adalah menggunakan kekerasan, yang tidak jarang berakhir dengan pertumpahan darah.
Secara psikologis, pelaku kekerasan bisa dikatakan “sakit”, tidak mampu memperlakukan diri secara normal untuk mengelola permasalahan yang dihadapi secara biasa. Banyaknya tekanan yang dihadapi, perlakuan yang tidak adil, dan ketakberdayaan, sehingga membuat orang menjadi frustasi. Ketika intensitas tersebut terus meningkat, muncul kemarahan dari dalam dirinya dan kemudian diekspresikan melalui tindakan kekerasan.
Melihat perkembangannya yang hampir tak terkendali, adalah tidak mungkin bagi kita membiarkan kekerasan untuk terus terjadi. Kita harus memutus jaring kekerasan dan keluar dari kemelut tersebut. Hal pertama yang mungkin dilakukan adalah memunculkan dan menyebarluaskan wacana perdamaian dan anti (nir)kekerasan sebagai kesadaran dan sikap hidup bersama. Kemampuan untuk hidup secara positif dalam masyarakat pluralis sangat diperlukan, sehingga provokasi-provokasi tidak lagi dengan mudah mengoyak jalinan nilai-nilai perdamaian, kebersamaan dan anti (nir)kekerasan. Tapi agar lebih efektif, usaha-usaha tersebut perlu ditunjang oleh kondisi struktural yang juga menunjang, yang demokratis, terbuka, rasional, dialogal, adil dan mumpuni.
Secara umum, paling tidak ada dua sikap yang cenderung diambil oleh manusia dalam menghadapi fenomena kekerasan, yaitu “sikap pasif” dan “resistensi dengan kekerasan”. Orang yang memilih sikap pasif biasanya dilingkupi oleh situasi ketakberdayaan (powerlessness) dalam menghadapi segala permasalahan hidup, terlebih dalam situasi dan tindakan kekerasan yang dialaminya. Sikap pasif itu bisa jadi disebabkan oleh nilai-nilai, keyakinan yang selama ini dipegang teguh dalam masyarakatnya, seperti agama dan sosial-budaya, atau karena kurangnya pengetahuan serta ketakpedulian terhadap lingkungan yang memunculkan sikap egois dan menipisnya solidaritas sosial. Akibat fatal dari tertanamnya sikap pasivisme ini, kekerasan dan ketidakadilan akan tetap bertahan kukuh dan langgeng.
Sementara kecenderungan kedua, resistensi dengan kekerasan yang bersumber dari potensi agresivitas manusia untuk mempertahankan hidupnya (survive) untuk melawan kekerasan tidak lebih baik dari kekerasan yang dilawan, bahkan tidak jarang malah lebih kejam. Selain itu, sebagai reaksi spontan, resistensi dengan kekerasan bisa muncul karena keputusasaan yang melingkupi korban akiat kekerasan yang telah sekian lama dialaminya. Atau munculnya godaan (keinginan) untuk menyelesaikan masalah dengan cepat sehingga mendorongnya melakukan kekerasan untuk menghilangkan kekerasan (fisik) yang dialaminya. Situasi ini seperti pepatah “jika ingin damai, bersiaplah untuk berperang” yang akhirnya dimanifestasikan sebagai “lakukanlah kekerasan untuk menghadapi kekerasan tersebut” atau adagium “violence breeds violence” atau “kekerasan melahirkan kekerasan”.
Sebagaimana halnya sikap pasivisme, resistensi dengan kekerasan ini juga melanggengkan dan memupuk kekerasan, bahkan menjadi legitimasi bagi pelaku kekerasan untuk menindas atau melahirkan kekerasan yang lebih hebat lagi. Keduanya tidak mendorong pada perubahan situasi menjadi lebih adil dan damai. Dengan demikian sikap aktif anti (nir)kekerasan bisa menjadi pilihan dan semangat baru dalam memperjuangkan keadilan dan perdamaian.
Secara historis, gerakan nirkekerasan telah dikenal sejak sebelum Masehi pada masa Romawi Kuno, yaitu ‘long march’ ke Gunung Suci (Sacred Mount) yang dilakukan oleh para plebeian dan tentara sebagai gerakan menuntut reformasi. Seiring perjalanan waktu pola, sistem dan teknik gerakan aktif nirkekerasan ini mengalami perkembangan dan tersebar ke penjuru dunia serta menjadi semakin kompleks. Di mana-mana gerakan nirkekerasan semakin dikenal dan mulai banyak digunakan, hingga kemudian lahirlah Gandhi “el-Phenomenon” dengan gerakan nirkekerasannya yang efektifitas, keluasan dan signifikansinya belum pernah terjadi sebelumnya (bahkan sampai sekarang?).
Secara personal Gandhi yang terkenal dengan “Salt March”nya memberikan kontribusi yang sangat signifikan dalam sejarah panjang gerakan nirkekerasan, terutama dengan eksperimen-eksperimen politiknya dalam menggunakan metode nonkooperasi, pelanggaran, penolakan menguasai pemerintah, pengubahan kebijakan pemerintah, dan pengrusakan sistem politik. Gandhi melakukan modifikasi dengan memperhalus karakter teknik dan praktek gerakan nirkekerasan sehingga lebih dinamis, aktif dan fokus perhatian terbesar terletak pada strategi dan taktik.
Dalam aksi perlawanan nirkekerasan ini Gandhi menegaskan bahwa keberhasilan hanya akan dicapai apabila dilakukan dengan disiplin dan kesadaran diri, serta komitmen yang kuat bagi seluruh komponen perjuangan. Apabila dasar ini ringkih, tidak terbangun dengan kokoh dan utuh, maka terjadinya misorientasi terhadap arah gerakan dan kehilangan “ruh”nya bukanlah sesuatu yang musahil dan tidak tertutup kemungkinan akan berubah menjadi aksi kekerasan.
Berkaitan dengan uraian di atas, berangkat dari pemikiran Gandhi, tulisan ini akan mencoba melihat lebih jauh strategi, teknik, peluang dan hambatan dalam aksi nirkekerasan dalam pergerakannya. Sebagai bahan kajian diangkat kasus “Aksi Mogok Massal Menentang Kedatangan George W. Bush di Inggris”.

Aksi Nirkekerasan Menentang Kedatangan George W. Bush di Inggris
Sejak dikeluarkannya kebijakan penyerangan ke Irak oleh Presiden AS George W. Bush hingga pasca kejatuhan penguasa Irak Saddam Husein, aksi-aksi yang mengecam kebijakan tersebut terus berlanjut, bahkan sampai sekarang. Masyarakat internasional merasa bahwa keputusan yang diambil penguasa AS dan sekutunya bukannya menyelesaikan masalah, akan tetapi memperparah keadaan, khususnya bagi rakyat Irak.
Ketakutan tersebut terbukti dengan tidak siapnya pasukan “pembebasan” dalam menghadapi situasi secara keseluruhan, terlebih setelah kejatuhan Saddam yang tak terduga. Penghancuran simbol-simbol rejim Saddam, penjarahan dan pengrusakan fasilitas-fasilitas umum menjadi kesibukan dan keasyikan tersendiri, yang hanya ditonton tanpa usaha penghentian. Bahkan hingga berbulan-bulan pasca kejatuhan Saddam, situasi di Irak bukannya membaik tetapi semakin terpuruk. Kebebasan, demokrasi, dan perbaikan nasib yang digembar-gemborkan AS dan sekutunya tidak terlihat sama sekali, kecuali kesengsaraan rakyat Irak.
Berkaitan dengan permasalahan di Irak, masyarakat internasional sejak awal sudah tergerak untuk secara bersama-sama menyuarakan penderitaan rakyat Irak akibat kebijakan Presiden AS George W. Bush. Kecaman, kritik, dan sikap anti Bush bergema di mana-mana di seluruh penjuru dunia, seperti Thailand, Filipina, dan Indonesia, termasuk di Inggris sendiri yang notabene merupakan sekutu terdekat AS dalam “perang” ini.
Sebagai contoh, secara spesifik kasus yang diangkat berkaitan dengan aksi nirkekerasan adalah aksi massal menentang kedatangan Presiden AS George Bush di London, Inggris. Adapun ilustrasinya secara kronologis sebagai berikut:
Rabu, 19 November 2003, setibanya Bush dan istri serta sekitar 700 anggota rombongannya (sekitar 250 orang merupakan agen rahasia) di Bandara Heatron, Kota London Selasa malam, sebelum melanjutkan perjalanan ke Istana Buckingham dengan helikopter kepresidenan AS, langsung disambut dengan protes sekitar seratus orang. Aksi ini dilakukan sebagai pemanasan sebelum aksi akbar esok harinya. Untuk aksi tersebut Michael Moore, pengarang dan pembuat film asal AS, yang tengah mempromosikan bukunya “Dude, where’s My Country” yang penuh kritik terhadap kepemimpinan Bush.turut memberikan dukungannya dan menghimbau agar warga Inggris untuk turun ke jalan. Rangkaian protes terhadap kunjungan Bush sudah berlangsung sejak kedatangannya.
Hari itu juga, sekitar 600 orang berkumpul di depan Istana Buckingham dengan membawa peluit, genderang, dan alat tabuh. Para pengunjuk rasa berdiam di depan istana sampai larut malam. Jumlah petugas keamanan yang menjaga mereka jauh lebih banyak dari pengunjuk rasa. Ratusan pengunjuk rasa juga berkumpul di Downing Street, termasuk Azmat Begg, yang puteranya ditahan di “Guantanamo Bay” karena dituduh sebagai anggota teroris.
Esoknya, Kamis, 20 November 2003, sekitar puluhan ribu pengunjuk rasa bergabung di pusat Kota London melakukan aksi memprotes kunjungan Presiden AS George W. Bush ke Inggris. Sejak pagi hari para aktivis antiperang berdatangan ke London dan berkumpul di dekat University of London serta Downing Street. Salah seorang pemimpin aktivis, Chris Nineham, berharap aksi demonstrasi ini akan membuat Kota London “berhenti”. Namun Walikota London, Ken Livingston, yang juga seorang aktivis antiperang menghimbau agar demonstrasi berlangsung damai.
Rencana aksi ini sebelumnya sempat dilarang karena alasan keamanan, yaitu adanya isu bahwa 15 – 20 anggota jaringan Al-Qaeda yang tinggal di Inggris merencanakan.sebuah serangan mematikan dan insiden ledakan bom di Turki -yang menewaskan 26 orang ini, termasuk Konsuler Jenderal Inggris Roger Short. Karena itu untuk pengamanannya pihak Kepolisian Metropolitan Kota London menyiapkan anggotanya sebanyak 14.000 ditambah agen rahasia Inggris dan AS.
Aksi demonstrasi yang dilakukan oleh berbagai kelompok aktivis antiperang seperti Stop the War Coalition, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Muslim Association of Great Britain dan Amnesty International dimulai pukul tiga sore waktu setempat. dengan mengambil jalur jalan-jalan protokol, melewati gedung-gedung pemerintahan, termasuk kantor Perdana Menteri Tony Blair di Downing Street. Dengan didukung spanduk, poster, peluit, genderang, dan berbagai alat bunyi-bunyian lainnya, mereka berjalan perlahan menuju arah gedung Parlemen. Salah satu bunyi spanduk “Dicari: Bush dan Blair, Penjahat Perang”.
Para pengunjuk rasa mengatakan bahwa dukungan Pemerintah Inggris terhadap kebijakan Presiden AS George W. Bush justru membuat kehidupan mereka menjadi lebih tidak aman. Menurut salah satu koordinator Stop War Coalition, Lindsey German, pihaknya telah mengingatkan sebelum Perang Irak bahwa serangan seperti yang terjadi di Istabul kemungkinan akan meningkat, “Satu-satunya cara untuk menghentikan ini (serangan) bukanlah dengan mengebomi rakyat, tetapi dengan menggunakan solusi politik”. Tak ketinggalan seorang sosiolog Jerman yang tinggal di Inggris juga menegaskan “Hal ini tak akan terjadi seandainya tak ada perang di Irak. Amerika telah membangun terorisnya sendiri”. Sedangkan Amnesty International memprotes kondisi para tersangka teroris yang ditahan di pusat penahanan AS di Teluk Guantanamo, Kuba. Para pengunjuk rasa juga memprotes besarnya biaya pengamanan Bush yang nantinya akan dibebankan kepada pembayar pajak di london, yaitu sekitar 2 poundstrerling setiap anggota keluarga.
Rangkaian aksi ini berakhir di Trafalgar Square dengan “upacara” penumbangan patung Bush –yang dibuat khusus dalam rangka kunjungan Bush ke Inggris- dengan cara ditarik memakai tali, lalu diinjak-injak. Aksi ini meniru aksi penumbangan patung Saddam Husein oleh pasukan AS pada 9 April lalu, ketika berhasil memasuki Kota Baghdad.

Benarkah Metode Nirkekerasan Realistis dan Efektif ?
Dari kasus di atas, muncul pertanyaan mendasar “mengapa aksi menentang kedatangan Bush di Inggris dikategorikan sebagai aksi yang nirkekerasan?” Ada dua alasan yang mendasarinya, pertama, walaupun sejak beberapa hari sebelum aksi berlangsung ada beberapa aktivis yang ditangkap, dengan alasan keamanan akibat isu akan adanya teror kelompok al-Qaeda, para pendukung aksi tidak terpancing emosinya untuk melakukan tindakan anarkis menuntut pembebasan mereka. Mereka tetap dengan perencanaan pagelaran aksi secara damai sebagai alat mereka, dan mereka sadar bahwa hal tersebut bagian dari resiko perjuangan. Dan kedua, jalannya aksi itu sendiri berlangsung relatif tenang, damai dan simpatik, bahkan mereka mendapatkan dukungan dari berbagai pihak. Selama aksi tidak terjadi anarkisme seperti tindakan kekerasan dan pengrusakan yang mengganggu stabilitas atau merugikan masyarakat umum, termasuk terorisme yang diduga pemerintah akan membonceng aksi tersebut.
Kedua alasan di atas memang belum sepenuhnya bisa menegaskankan sepenuhnya bahwa aksi tersebut sebagai nirkekerasan, tapi setidaknya, secara umum aksi di atas layak untuk dimasukkan ke dalam kategori nirkekerasan. Secara umum, batasan nirkekerasan masih terus diperdebatkan, dan masih belum pernah berada dalam satu kesimpulan yang “baku” dan universal. Di satu pihak, sebagian orang menganggap bahwa gerakan nirkekerasan sepenuhnya harus terhindar dari unsur-unsur kekerasan, termasuk simbol-simbol yang mencerminkan kekerasan itu sendiri. Sebagai contoh, dalam kasus di atas, aksi penumbangan patung Saddam tidak seharusnya dilakukan karena tindakan tersebut mencerminkan adanya unsur kekerasan, kebencian dan kemarahan. Sementara di pihak lain, sebagian menganggap hal tersebut masih merupakan sesuatu yang wajar, dan tidak bisa serta merta dikatakan sebagai kekerasan. Bagi mereka tindakan apapun selama tidak melukai, menyakiti, menyiksa atau menindas secara fisik orang lain, masih bisa dikategorikan sebagai aksi nirkekerasan.
Terlepas dari perdebatan di atas, nirkekerasan sebagai suatu fenomena telah mendapatkan tempat tersendiri dalam banyak aktivitas masyarakat dunia. Nirkekerasan telah menjadi alternatif dalam aksi-aksi perlawanan terhadap kekerasan seperti, penindasan, pelanggaran hak asasi manusia, ketidakadilan, kemiskinan ataupun kebijakan-kebijakan yang merugikan masyarakat umum. Bahkan sebagian orang tanpa sungkan menyatakan bahwa aksi nirkekerasan merupakan wujud dari semangat ketuhanan karena dilakukan untuk menegakkan kebenaran, yang hakikinya adalah milik Tuhan. Adapun untuk mencapai kebenaran dengan melawan kekerasan, harus dengan sikap yang dilandasi cinta-kasih.
Selain karena biaya untuk melakukan “counterthreat” mahal, ada beberapa alasan mengapa aksi nirkekerasan dipilih sebagai strategi, antara lain:
1. adanya mobilisasi massa dan partisipasi yang lebih besar.
2. mampu menarik simpati publik lebih luas, baik domestik ataupun internasional.
3. korban atau resiko yang ditimbulkan relatif lebih sedikit, bisa diminimalisir.
4. berkesinambungan, fleksibel, dan situasional.
5. membuka peluang untuk dilakukannya dialog.
6. mendapat legitimasi, baik agama, kultural, maupun politik.
7. mempercepat proses kesadaran publik.
8. memperkecil peluang penggunaan kekuatan kekerasan yang biasanya digunakan terhadap aksi separatis ataupun ketidakpatuhan.

Secara umum ada sejumlah prinsip-prinsip yang dikandung dalam gerakan nirkekerasan yang harus dipegang teguh oleh siapa pun yang akan melakukannya.
1. Memandang bahwa hidup sebagai sesuatu yang suci.
Mengapa manusia diciptakan tentunya bukan tanpa sebab. Tuhan menciptakan manusia sebagai manifestasi dari sifat cinta, kasih dan sayang-Nya. Oleh karena itu kehidupan harus dijaga dan tindakan zalim seperti menyakiti, menyiksa bahkan membunuh jiwa berarti merebut kecintaan Tuhan atau melakukan yang bukan haknya. Jadi, prinsip-prinsip kemanusiaan harus dijunjung tinggi.
2. Percaya bahwa setiap pribadi mempunyai hati nurani.
Setiap manusia memiliki hati-nurani, selain akal-pikiran dan fisik. Hati-nurani merupakan sesuatu yang suci, pancaran dari kebenaran Tuhan. Sejahat-jahatnya orang, ia tidak bisa mengingkari hati-nuraninya karena hati-nurani selalu benar. Dalam melakukan aksi nirkekerasan kita mesti mengetuk hati-nurani pelaku kekerasan atau melakukan tindakan penyadaran (conciousness), sebagaimana yang dicontohkan oleh Muhammad, Yesus, Gandhi maupun Luther King. Ini juga berlaku bagi pendukung nirkekerasan ketika berada di tengah situasi yang penuh godaan untuk membalas dengan tindakan kekerasan.
3. Bersedia berkorban bagi orang lain.
Sepertinya prinsip ini sulit dilakukan. Namun demi kebaikan dan tercapainya tujuan setiap pendukung aksi nirkekerasan harus, mau tidak mau, siap berkorban bagi orang lain.
4. Gerakan adalah sarana dan strategi menegakkan kebenaran dan keadilan
Sebagai sebuah pilihan yang strategis, yang harus selalu diingat adalah bahwa aksi nirkekerasan bertujuan untuk menegakkan kebenaran dan keadilan. Tidak ada tujuan selain itu, apalagi kepentingan politik-kepentingan, baik pribadi atau kelompok.

Dalam prakteknya, gerakan nirkekerasan tidak selalu berhasil, antara lain karena belum berkembang secara merata dan semakin kompleksnya tantangan yang dihadapi. Jadi, sebagai suatu teknik intuitif, gerakan ini menuntut usaha lebih lanjut untuk meningkatkan efektifitas dan potensi politiknya. Untuk itu, diperlukan suatu metodologi gerakan yang sistematis dan komprehensif, walaupun sebenarnya dalam gerakan nirkekerasan tidak ada strategi khusus yang siap pakai (ready for use). Metodologi yang bertitik tolak dari pengalaman-pengalaman gerakan nirkekerasan dan proses dialektikanya ini sangat diperlukan dalam menghadapi perkembangan, kompleksitas dan modernisasi kekerasan.
Secara metodologis (umum) ada dua jenis persiapan dalam gerakan nirkekerasan, yaitu persiapan pribadi dan persiapan kelompok. Persiapan pribadi bisa dilakukan dengan melakukan dialog tentang pengalaman, studi dan refleksi pribadi terhadap kekerasan dan akibatnya. Ini diperlukan untuk membangun keyakinan dan menumbuhkan nilai-nilai dasar nirkekerasan, dan selanjutnya hasil refleksi ini akan dijadikan titik tolak dalam menyusun strategi aksi. Selain itu, setiap pribadi diajak untuk melakukan latihan-latihan pribadi seperti puasa atau tidak makan daging (hewan). Latihan-latihan tersebut bisa dan sebaiknya dilakukan bersama-sama dalam suatu kelompok agar makin memperkuat soliditas antar pribadi.
Setelah masing-masing pribadi memiliki kesadaran dan memahami filosofi gerakan nirkekerasan serta mampu menjadi bagian dari kelompok, maka tahap berikutnya adalah mengorganisir dan mempersolid kelompok. Di sini masing-masing pribadi harus mampu memunculkan dan memperkuat keterikatan persaudaraan antar pribadi, memiliki visi dan persepsi yang selaras dan lengkap tentang gerakan nirkekerasan maupun situasi kekerasan, serta saling mengingatkan satu sama lain agar tidak terpengaruh dengan situasi kekerasan, sehingga tidak mudah disusupi oleh orang lain yang memiliki maksud tidak baik atau tidak sejalan dengan gerakan nirkekerasan (yang seperti kasus di atas adanya ketakukan disusupinya aksi oleh gerakan terorisme).
Di sini, bentuk latihannya sama dengan latihan pribadi, seperti puasa, namun dilakukan bersama-sama untuk melatih pengendalian diri atau untuk merasakan penderitaan orang lain. Dilakukan juga latihan strategi dan taktik gerakan sesuai dengan permasalahan yang dihadapi, serta simulasi-simulasi untuk mematangkan hasil latihan. Perlu juga dilakukan kerja sama dan konsolidasi dengan kelompok-kelompok lain agar gerakan memiliki dukungan, kekuatan, dan daya tekan yang kuat sehingga tidak mudah dilemahkan. Seperti kasus di atas, aksi demonstrasi dilakukan tidak hanya oleh satu kelompok, melainkan beberapa kelompok yang bergabung menjadi satu kekuatan, yaitu menentang kedatangan Presiden AS George W. Bush di Inggris berkaitan dengan kebijakannya melakukan penyerangan ke Irak, maupun isu terorisme.
Sebelum melakukan aksi, persiapan lain setelah latihan-latihan adalah melakukan analisis kritis terhadap kekerasan berdasarkan data otentik dikaitkan dengan faktor-faktor sosial kemasyarakatan. Karena analisis kekerasan tidak mungkin bisa sekali jadi, maka harus dilakukan secara terus menerus dan berkesinambungan agar nantinya tidak menjadi stereotip dan dapat membantu dalam penyusunan strategi gerakan.
Karena dalam gerakan nirkekerasan tidak dikenal tokoh sentral, maka setiap pribadi dan/atau kelompok harus berperan aktif dan bertanggung jawab terhadap pengembangan gerakan dan strateginya. Agar tersusun rancangan gerakan nirkekerasan yang efektif, tepat dan berhasil-guna, diperlukan inisiatif dan kreativitas pribadi dan/atau kelompok dalam menentukan langkah-langkahnya, seperti 5 W dan 1 H (who, what, when, where, why dan how) secara jelas. Dalam rencana strategis gerakan juga perlu dicermati bentuk atau model yang akan dipakai dalam aksi. Hal ini penting karena situasi kekerasan yang dihadapi unik, khas, situasional, sehingga harus dihadapi dengan unik, khas dan situasional juga.
Dalam kasus aksi di Inggris di atas terlihat bagaimana perencanaan suatu aksi yang terorganisir dengan baik. Gerakan yang dimulai dengan aksi-aksi kecil sebelum kedatangan Bush ke Inggris, hingga aksi massal yang berakhir di Trafalgar Square. Persiapan-persiapan yang dilakukan begitu matang, baik skenario, model bahkan pernak-pernik yang dipergunakan seperti patung Saddam yang dirobohkan sebagai aksi pamungkas dari demontrasi. Maka dari itu, penting untuk memahami dan berpedoman pada filosofi bahwa “perjuangan demi kebaikan yang sendiri-sendiri akan mudah dikalahkan oleh kejahatan yang terorganisir” atau dengan kata lain “gerakan nirkekerasan yang tidak terorganisir akan terkalahkan oleh kekerasan yang terorganisir”.
Berkenaan dengan pertanyaan sub-judul terakhir, realistis dan efektifitas metode nirkekerasan sebagai paham dan gerakan sedikit banyaknya bisa dibuktikan oleh banyak aksi, yang salah satunya “Aksi Massal Menentang Kedatangan George W. Bush di Inggris” di atas.

TNI pasca soeharto: orde penebusan dosa?

TNI PASCA SOEHARTO
Orde Penebusan Dosa?

Kisah “manis” yang panjang dari rezim otoriter Orde Baru selama lebih dari 32 tahun berakhir dengan tragis. Kepemimpinan Sang Jenderal Soeharto dengan dukungan militer (khususnya Angkatan Darat), akhirnya takluk dan di’lengser keprabon’kan oleh kekuatan gerakan massa (rakyat) yang berbasis pada gerakan mahasiswa. Ini dimungkinkan oleh banyak faktor, antara lain di masa-masa penghujung kekuasaannya Soeharto telah semakin kehilangan legitimasi akibat banyaknya kebijakan yang tidak populer dan hanya menguntungkan kepentingan kekuasaan dan kroninya. Atau mungkin juga karena terlalu lama berkuasa, sehingga ia (dengan dukungan militer) tidak lagi peka dalam menyikapi perkembangan global yang mengedepankan prinsip-prinsip demokrasi dan keterbukaan -(seperti yang dikatakan oleh Francis Fukuyama bahwa memasuki abad ke-21, rezim-rezim otoriter akan jatuh dan digantikan oleh pemerintahan yang demokratis). Hal ini diakui sendiri oleh sebagian dari kalangan militer, bahwa pemerintahan Orde Baru telah gagal dalam mengantisipasi trend kecenderungan global yang utamanya adalah arus demokratisasi dan penegakan hak asasi manusia (HAM).
Sementara itu, selama pemerintahan Orde Baru, keterlibatan militer dalam kehidupan sosial politik negara sangatlah dominan. Kondisi ini tak lepas dari wacana politik Orde Baru yang merangkai doktrin Dwifungsi ABRI (sekarang dikembalikan menjadi TNI) sebagai sebuah idiologi sekaligus konstruksi sosial. Artinya, tentara tidak mau membatasi dirinya hanya sebagai kekuatan militer, melainkan juga berwenang terlibat dalam kehidupan sosial politik. Dwifungsi ABRI diartikan sebagai fungsi-fungsi ABRI -yang bersifat genuine dan intrinsik- untuk kekuatan pertahanan-keamanan dan kekuatan sosial dalam rangka perjuangan nasional dalam mencapai tujuan nasional. Secara konseptual maupun praktis-politis, Dwifungsi dimaksudkan sebagai “kontra-posisi” atas idiologi “supremasi sipil” (civil supremacy) yang menempatkan militer hanya sebagai alat negara di bawah kendali sipil.
Menurut K. Man Haim, ada tiga faktor yang mendorong militer ‘terjerumus’ dalam perpolitikan. Pertama kepentingan individu, yaitu ambisi-ambisi pribadi para perwira militer untuk merebut posisi penting (strategis) dalam jaringan kekuasaan dan keinginan memperoleh materi sebagai konsekuensi jabatan tersebut. Kedua kepentingan kelompok, yakni keinginan untuk mendominasi dan mengalienasi kelompok lain melalui jalur kekuasaan. Berkaitan dengan status mereka sebagai kelompok elite (sesuai konsep satria), militer harus merebut kekuasaan untuk memenuhi standar hidup dan selanjutnya secara sistematis membangun hegemoni. Dan ketiga adalah kepentingan nasional, yakni mempertahankan dan membangun keamanan negara dan masyarakat. Dengan asumsi bahwa mereka adalah kekuatan pengintegrasi bangsa, militer berhak melakukan intervensi dan pemaksaan (dengan kekerasan bahkan pembunuhan) untuk melindungi kepentingan serta keutuhan bangsa dan negara. Kemudian muncul satu pemikiran lain, bahwa norma-norma profesionalitas militer dianggap lebih tinggi dan mampu (dari segi kepemimpinan nasional) dibandingkan “orang-orang sipil yang korup”.
Dalam merebut dan mengelola kekuasaan, ada dua cara yang dilakukan oleh militer. Pertama dengan berperan langsung (direct roles), yaitu militer secara langsung mempengaruhi pengambilan kebijakan melalui keterlibatannya dalam birokrasi, politik dan partai politik. Artinya, militer mengambil alih pucuk pimpinan dan jabatan penting dalam kabinet atau mengangkat pejabat sipil yang lemah dan koorporatif, kemudian melakukan penyeragaman nilai-nilai idiologi dan terlibat dalam pendirian partai politik (baca: Golkar) sekaligus menjadi pemimpin partai tersebut yang kemudian memaksakan rumusan gagasan-gagasan pembangunan. Selain itu, militer juga masuk ke wilayah hukum, perwakilan rakyat dan membangun jaringan bisnis nasional yang dikuasai oleh keluarga dan kroninya.
Kedua, berperan tidak langsung (indirect roles), yakni militer tidak terlibat dalam struktur pengambil kebijakan, melainkan secara aktif mempengaruhi pengambilan kebijakan tersebut melalui pers maupun dialog dengan partai politik dan organisasi sosial kemasyarakatan. Yaitu dengan mengatur dan sekaligus mengawasi pelaksanaan undang-undang pers (sensor intelektual), militer (bersama pemerintah) juga aktif membungkam semua aspirasi partai politik maupun organisasi sosial (dari kemungkinan lahirnya “people power”) untuk melindungi kepentingan penguasa.
Adalah kenyataan yang tak bisa dipungkiri bahwa pada masa penguasaan Orde Baru, militer berhasil (ikut?) “membangun” Indonesia. Ini terlihat pada beberapa hal, di antaranya: (1) perkembangan dalam bidang ekonomi, yaitu terjadinya lonjakan income perkapita (peningkatan daya beli masyarakat) dari sekitar US$ 125 menjadi US$ 1.000 sebelum Indonesia dilanda krisis moneter pada tahun 1997 (atau terjadi penurunan angka kemiskinan). (2) Dalam bidang kesehatan, yakni menurunnya angka kematian bayi dan angka harapan hidup meningkat; tersedianya puskesmas di setiap kecamatan dan fasilitas klinik di setiap desa. (3) Dalam bidang pendidikan, yaitu setiapdesa telah memiliki SD (bahkan ada desa yang sudah memiliki SMP) dan hampir setiap kecamatan memiliki SMA, dan semua propinsi telah memiliki perguruan tinggi. Dan (4) Dalam bidang stabilitas negara, walaupun terjadi “gangguan” di beberapa daerah seperti Timor Timur, Papua, Maluku dan Aceh.
Namun sebaliknya, keberhasilan tersebut tidak disertai dengan pembangunan demokrasi, penghormatan dan penegakan HAM, konservasi lingkungan hidup dan pengentasan KKN, bahkan malah mempertajam jurang pemisah dalam masyarakat (seperti yang miskin dengan yang kaya). Hal inilah yang kemudian menjadi masalah ketika lahir dan berkembangnya kesadaran bangsa Indonesia, (khususnya umat Islam) yang lebih dari 25 tahun menjadi korban kekerasan dan ketertindasan.
Seiring dengan hal tersebut, di tubuh militer sendiri terjadi pembusukan dari dalam, pertama karena kesibukan para elite militer mengurus masalah politik dan bisnis untuk menumpuk harta, dan kedua karena masuknya spirit Islam ke dalam militer yang melahirkan faksi Hijau (seperti Feisal Tanjung, R. Hartono, Prabowo, Kiflan Zein, Subagio HS, Muchdi PR, Syafri Syamsuddin dll.). Dan sebagai reaksi, lahir pula faksi Merah Putih yang berbasis sosial dan Kristen di bawah bendera L.B. Moerdani.
Di tengah situasi yang tidak mendukung tersebut, keberadaan militer yang sudah keropos semakin terjepit. Terlebih setelah Soeharto membaca pidato kenegaraan terakhirnya pada tanggal 21 Mei 1998 pk. 09.00 yang menyatakan bahwa ia me”lengser keprabon”kan diri dari jabatan presiden. Militer kehilangan patron namun berupaya mempertahan status quo di tengah hujatan dan kebencian masyarakat (nasional maupun internasional).
Kondisi ini membuka ruang bagi perjuangan demokrasi. Masyarakat mulai berani untuk menuntut pengungkapan dan penyelesaian secara hukum pelanggaran-pelanggaran HAM yang telah dilakukan oleh militer. Militer menjadi semakin terpojok dan harus memulai babak baru (setelah dihapuskannya Dwifungsi) dalam proses pencarian jati diri tanpa tempat bergantung. Tak ada pilihan lain kecuali mereka harus melakukan reposisi, redefinisi dan reaktualisasi peran dalam konteks reformasi menuju negara yang demokratis. Artinya, setelah menikmati kejayaannya lebih dari 20 tahun, militer harus mengakui dan tunduk kepada kedaulatan pemerintahan sipil.
Perubahan besar yang terjadi pada tatanan dan struktur kemasyarakatan serta kenegaraan juga berimbas pada TNI. Inilah yang dilakukan oleh Menteri Pertahanan dan keamanan (Menhankam) dan Panglima TNI (waktu itu) Jenderal Wiranto, yaitu dengan mengeluarkan tiga komponen kebijakan. Pertama, memisahkan Kepolisian (Polri) dari organisasi TNI dan ditempatkan sebagai alat keamanan (sipil). Kedua, TNI ditempatkan sebagai alat pertahanan, dan ketiga, anggota TNI yang aktif tidak diperbolehkan menduduki jabatan politik, kecuali pensiun dari kedinasan militernya.
Jadi, untuk memotret masa depan TNI dalam hubungannya dengan kekuasaan sipil, paling tidak dapat dilihat dari tiga hal. Pertama, pertarungan elite politik sipil – militer sebagai penentu posisi TNI. Maksudnya adalah TNI dituntut untuk bisa bersikap profesional dan proposional dalam menyikapi situasi dan kondisi serta perubahan kehidupan sosial dan politik negara. Kedua, pembentukan format organisasi TNI dari struktural ke fungsional. Artinya, TNI harus merumuskan implementasi struktur organisasi yang tidak hierarkis dan didasarkan pada perimbangan kebutuhan TNI dan strategi keamanan. Dan ketiga, digantikannya Dwifungsi menjadi doktrin pertahanan. Artinya, TNI harus kembali kepada tugas pokoknya sebagai alat pertahanan negara, bukan terlibat dalam urusan sosial, politik dan ekonomi. Untuk itu perlu dilakukan perubahan UU Pertahanan Keamanan menjadi UU Bela Negara.

sipil-militer indonesia: sebuah hubungan yang kompromistis?

SIPIL-MILITER INDONESIA: Sebuah Hubungan yang Kompromistis?




Mengulik pola hubungan sipil-militer kontemporer, tentunya tidak bisa dilepaskan dari pengaruh Perang Dingin. Berakhirnya Perang Dingin telah melahirkan lingkungan keamanan global yang buruk, yang penuh dengan “ranjau ketidakpastian” dan memperburuk hubungan sipil-militer, yaitu sipil mengalami pelemahan kontrol terhadap militer. Kondisi ini bertentangan dengan logika Harold Lasswell bahwa dengan berakhirnya Perang Dingin semestinya kontrol sipil atas militer menjadi lebih kuat, karena fakta bahwa militer relatif lebih mudah dikontrol dalam lingkungan yang damai dibanding dalam lingkungan yang penuh ancaman dan tantangan perang. (Desch, 2002).

Sebagai isu yang sangat kompleks dan tidak selalu jelas, hubungan sipil-militer tidak hanya dilihat dari persoalan menyangkut konflik antara sipil dengan militer, tetapi bisa saja persoalannya menyangkut pertikaian antar sipil atau pertikaian antar militer atau bahkan konflik antar koalisi sipil-militer. Ibarat pepatah lama, “sipil tanpa militer adalah pincang, sedangkan militer tanpa sipil adalah buta”. Artinya adalah, bahwa keberadaan sipil dan militer laksana pisau bermata dua yang tak bisa dipisahkan begitu saja, ada tarik-ulur kegunaan (baca: kepentingan) yang sama sekaligus bertolak belakang.

Sekarang ini terdapat ketidakpastian yang semakin besar tentang perananan perang dan institusi militer dalam masyarakat, berasal dari sifat-sifat kontradiktif dari periode Perang Dingin sejak 1945. (Shaw: 2001). Dalam kebanyakan konsep tentang militer di masyarakat Barat, peran militer pada dasarnya untuk mendukung aspirasi politik masyarakat di bawah kepemimpinan sipil. Ketika peranannya telah menyimpang jauh dari apa yang dimaksud, maka ia dianggap telah melakukan intervensi politik. (Shaw: 2001).

Mengenai hal ini, Samuel P. Huntington menyatakan secara tegas bahwa sekarang mayoritas profesional militer (praetorian societies) di Barat menerima kekuasaan sipil (civic societies) sungguh-sungguh sebagai hal yang semestinya ada. Namun ada kekhawatiran bahwa militer akan memanfaatkan peluang ketika otoritas sipil dibagi-bagi dengan cara mengadu domba (devide et impera) pihak sipil untuk mendapatkan otonomi yang lebih besar. Sebaliknya, jika otoritas sipil relatif menyatu, maka kontrol sipil akan menjadi lebih mudah dilakukan. (Desch: 2002).

Bertolak belakang dengan negara maju, di negara-negara berkembang (Dunia Ketiga), militer cenderung terlibat lebih besar dan kuat dalam politik nasional yang dipandang sebagai suatu kerangka pikir yang baru dan berbeda dengan Barat. Tentang keterlibatan militer di negara-negara Dunia Ketiga ini para ahli mendefinisikannya sebagai rejim militer, yang tidak lagi dianggap sebagai rejim yang hanya didominasi oleh militer, melainkan suatu “fusionis” antara rejim militer dan sipil. Jadi, rejim militer dapat diklasifikasikan sebagai hakikat hubungan antara elite dengan struktur militer dan sipil, atau hakikat sarana politis dan administratif yang dimanfaatkan dalam rejim militer untuk mencapai modernisasi dan legitimasi.

Walaupun pihak militer melibatkan diri dalam politik di negara-negara Dunia Ketiga dan dapat memberikan sumbangan dalam pembangunan masyarakat, tidak berarti keterlibatan politiknya bersifat tetap. Rejim militer tidak dianggap sebagai bentuk-bentuk pemerintahan yang alamiah, walaupun kebudayaan-kebudayaan politik yang berbeda akan menentukan hal ini secara berbeda pula. Seperti dikatakan Sundhaussen bahwa “Jika rejim militer memulihkan konsensus atau sekurang-kurangnya menjalankan hukum dan membangun institusi-institusi politis yang dapat berfungsi untuk memecahkan konflik demi maksud-maksud praktis atau hidup lebih lama dari manfaatnya, kemudian gagal mencapai tujuan-tujuan tersebut, maka rejim ini kehilangan dasar keberadaan (raison d'etre), legitimasi dan kemampuannya untuk berkuasa. Terlepas dari apakah rejim militer itu gagal atau berhasil, dalam jangka panjang rejim itu dapat disingkirkan dan bahkan dapat menjadi sangat merugikan (counter productive). (Sundhaussen: 1988). Jadi sudah seharusnya rejim tersebut menarik diri sebelum masyarakat umum “mau” menerimanya lagi”.

Konsep dikotomis hubungan antara sipil dan militer di Dunia Ketiga dengan supremasi sipil di dalamnya sama sekali tidak memadai dalam rangka menjelaskan hubungan sipil-militer di Dunia Ketiga. Dengan begitu hubungan sipil-militer yang suram tidak hanya disebabkan oleh kurangnya modernitas masyarakat, tetapi juga oleh keadaan ketertiban negara, tradisi-tradisi nasional, dan doktrin militer suatu negara. Kapanpun hubungan sipil-militer akan ditentukan oleh faktor-faktor seperti, keadaan-keadaan suatu pemerintah berkuasa, hubungan dengan negara-negara lain, tingkat spesialisasi fungsional antara unsur-unsur eselon atas kaum elite yang memerintah, tingkat perselisihan fraksi dalam tubuh elite yang sedang berkuasa, tingkat birokrasi politik, sikap-sikap historis terhadap peran militer dalam kehidupan politik, struktur institusional masyarakat dan kepentingan korps militer. Berkaitan dengan hal itu, ada tiga pola yang bisa terjadi, pertama menyerahkan kekuasaannya (abdication), kedua menjadi sipil kembali (recivilianization), ketiga pola tengahan dengan menjadi semi sipil (quasi-civilianization). (Rivai Nur: 2000).

Fenomena arus demokrasi memperlihatkan bahwa strategi demokratisasi lewat penguatan masyarakat sipil (civil society) akhirnya mendapat “tempat” dalam wacana politik. Gerakan demokrasi menempatkan kekuatan masyarakat sipil sebagai kelompok yang memiliki otonomi untuk menuntut jaminan bagi HAM, kebebasan berbicara dan menyatakan pendapat serta keadilan, termasuk dalam masalah pembagian sumber daya ekonomi yang merata.

Sebagaimana didefinisikan oleh Heningsen, masyarakat sipil merupakan pengelompokan dari warga negara, yang dengan bebas dan egaliter mampu melakukan “wacana” dan “praksis” tentang segala hal yang berkaitan dengan permasalahan kemasyarakatan secara keseluruhan. Sementara Alfred Stepan secara sederhana mengartikan masyarakat sipil sebagai wilayah dimana terdapat gerakan sosial atau institusi nonpemerintah –seperti ormas, institusi keagamaan, kelompok perempuan dan arus intelektual-, dan organisasi profesi – seperti ahli hukum, wartawan, serikat pekerja, wirausahawan dll.- yang berjuang untuk mengimbangi negara -yang mendominasi dan mengatomisasi masyarakat- dengan membentuk diri mereka menjadi suatu kerangka bersama guna menyatakan diri dan memajukan kepentingannya. (Stepan: 1999). Jadi, dalam masyarakat sipil terdapat jaringan-jaringan ataupun kelompok-kelompok sosial yang terdiri dari keluarga ataupun organisasi-organisasi sukarela yang harus dibedakan dengan klan, suku atau jaringan-jaringan “klientelisme”, karena variabel utama di dalamnya adalah sifat publik dan sipil yang menyiratkan keharusan adanya kebebasan dan keterbukaan untuk berserikat, berkumpul dan mengeluarkan pendapat serta kesempatan yang sama dalam mempertahankan kepentingan-kepentingan di depan umum.

Penempatan masyarakat sipil akan dapat terlaksana jika didasari oleh sebuah sistem politik yang legitimated, yang dilandasi dengan moral dan “benar-benar” memberikan pelayanan kepada masyarakatnya. Politik adalah “tanggung jawab” yang diekspresikan lewat “tindakan” karena ia memiliki dasar (metafisik) yang tumbuh dari kesadaran (kepastian) yang dinamakan “ingatan tentang yang ada” (the memory of being), yang bagi mereka yang beriman disebut Tuhan. Landasan tumpu etika tanggung jawab inilah yang membedakan masyarakat dengan sistem politik yang berdasar pada rasionalitas instrumental (the realm of needs and necessity) seperti sistem liberalisme maupun sosialisme. (Arif Budiman: 1997).





Drama Hubungan Sipil-Militer Indonesia



Sekarang ini, orang melihat hubungan sipil-militer tidak lagi hanya pada masalah kudeta militer atau tingkat frekuensi konflik antara sipil dan militer, tapi juga pada dominasi kontrol antara keduanya, baik sebagai definisi maupun indikatornya. Yang menjadi subyek adalah sipil dan militer yang tidak dapat dipisah baik kedudukan dan perannya. Jika dibandingkan sipil hanya mempunyai status tunggal sedangkan militer setidak-tidaknya mempunyai tiga status, yaitu status sebagai kelompok, lembaga, dan kekuatan. Setiap status dimainkan dalam peran ganda atau majemuk.

Mengenai pola hubungan sipil-militer (baca: kontrol sipil atas militer) pasca Perang Dingin, Dech mengatakan bahwa pihak sipil paling mudah mengontrol militer ketika mereka (terutama) menghadapi ancaman dari luar (internasional), dan paling sulit mengontrol militer ketika mereka (terutama) menghadapi ancaman domestik (nasional). Menurutnya, ada lima persoalan potensial dalam ketiga pendekatan hubungan sipil-militer, yaitu 1) saling bergantinya posisi strategis kedua belah pihak tergantung preferensi siapa yang lebih kuat; 2) salah satu pihak berbesar hati ‘mengalah’, mengubah pandangannya terhadap isu yang dipermasalahkan, namun bukan berarti kalah; 3) kedua belah pihak berkompromi dan saling tawar-menawar (namun seringkali menyembunyikan kemenangan dari salah satu pihak); 4) tak ada kata kompromi, penyelesaian dengan jalan pertikaian, menang atau kalah; dan 5) kontrol sipil kuat ketika preferensi sipil selalu menang. (Desch: 2002).

Hubungan sipil-militer berlangsung dari dua belah pihak dapat terjadi karena hubungan setingkat atau hirarkis. Hubungan sipil-militer ini perlu dipahami bersama dan saling mengerti posisi masing-masing sebagai prasyarat utama terciptanya negara demokratis. Karenanya masyarakat sipil perlu meningkatkan kualitas sumber daya manusia guna menyongsong masyarakat demokratis. Militer sudah semestinya tanggap terhadap perubahan ke arah masyarakat madani yang sesuai dengan jiwa zaman yang dengan sendirinya mengurangi campur tangannya secara gradual terhadap hak-hak sipil.

Meskipun ada sebagian kalangan yang menolak dikotomi sipil dengan militer, namun pada dataran realitas perlu dicermati variasi hubungan sipil-militer itu sendiri, termasuk yang baik maupun yang buruk. Dalam hal ini dapat juga terjadi perubahan hubungan dari setingkat ke hirarkis yang mengakibatkan subordinasi dan bahkan tereksploitasi. Disharmonisasi hubungan terjadi dan berkembang karena keduanya menjaga jarak dengan memonopoli previlegenya. Monopoli ini hanya dinikmati golongan superordinasi. Namun, hubungan semacam ini dapat dikatakan tidak wajar dan tidak imbang sebagaimana akan tampak pada hubungan sipil-militer di Indonesia selama ini. (Diamond & Flatter: 2000).

Mempelajari hubungan sipil-militer di Indonesia berarti melakukan “stock opname” terhadap sejarah militer umumnya dan sejarah hubungan sipil-militer khususnya. Pola historiografi sipil-militer Indonesia memiliki fokus sesuai dengan tekanan dan jiwa zaman yang berlaku waktu itu. Periode 1945-1949 (periode aksi), berlangsung hubungan ekual dan beranjak berubah, dimana kompetisi sipil dan militer mulai tampak dalam panggung politik Indonesia. Periode berikutnya, 1949-1959 (periode adomodasi), TNI mulai mencari jalan untuk melegitimasi prestasi di bidang pertahanan dan keamanan. Periode 1959–1965 (periode dominasi), TNI mengkongkretkan legitimasi dwifungsi ABRI, dimana fenomena historis dipakai untuk menguatkan posisi TNI untuk mendominasi sipil. Kemudian periode 1965 - 1998 (periode hegemoni), merupakan periode “militer-otoritarian” yang menciptakan ‘warldordism’ guna melakukan total control terhadap sipil meski akhirnya membawa lengsernya pemerintahan Suharto.

Setelah mengalami hubungan sipil-militer yang “menang-kalah” pada masa Orde Baru, untuk memprediksikan pola hubungan sipil-militer Indonesia yang baru akan sangat sulit. Hal ini berkaitan erat dengan dinamika internal maupun eksternal militer. Meskipun ada kemajuan, banyak kalangan menilai, perubahan di tubuh militer pasca Orde Baru hanya euforia, wujud dari respon atas tuntutan reformasi yang didesak kuat rakyat melalui mahasiswa. Perubahan di dalam tubuh militer tidak lebih sebagai perubahan simbolik karena tidak disertai dengan konsep, orientasi dan komitmen yang jelas, yang terkesan dilakukan secara tergesa-gesa dan kurang serius. Artinya, secara komprehensif perubahan tersebut belum dapat menjawab hubungan ideal sipil-militer di Indonesia. (Budi Susanto: 1995).

Bisa kita bayangkan, bagaimana mungkin momen sepenting “reformasi” –termasuk di dalamnya agenda penghapuskan dwifungsi ABRI yang tentunya dimaksudkan membatasi ruang gerak TNI dalam bidang-bidang yang pernah digelutinya dan memaksa TNI kembali ke “barak”- ternyata belum bisa menjadi ‘biduk’ yang membawa pada perubahan yang signifikan. Jangankan untuk menempatkan militer di bawah kontrol sipil, ibarat permainan catur, politisi sipil kita yang baru belajar bermain catur beberapa bulan alias masih ‘hijau’ tetapi harus menantang lawan (militer) yang pernah merajai dunia percaturan nasional. Hebatnya, di dalam pertandingan, politisi sipil yang sebenarnya kalah ‘kelas’ dan kalah ‘cerdas’, ternyata mampu men’dikte’ arah/gerak permainan lawan dan kemudian memberikan “skak-mat”. Usut punya usut, ternyata ada “kong-kalikong”, militer disuap (atau diancam?) harus mengalah dan bersedia di’obok-obok’, dengan iming-iming keleluasaan “ruang gerak” di belakang layar.

Banyak ambiguitas keberadaan militer di Indonesia, dimana militer bisa memainkan dua peran berbeda sekaligus. Di satu sisi militer sebagai alat pertahanan negara, namun di sisi lain bisa berubah menjadi alat penghancur keutuhan negara, sebagai teman sekaligus musuh, sebagai ‘penyulut’ konflik sekaligus ‘pemadam’nya, dan lainnya yang kontradiktif. Kondisi ini dilematis sekali, di tengah maraknya arus demokrasi (baca: reformasi), ternyata politisi sipil kita ‘asyik-masyuk’ dengan diri dan kelompoknya, dan lupa dengan “beban” untuk menegakkan reformasi di segala bidang, termasuk pertahanan dan keamanan.

Dalam hal ini Rivai Nur dkk. menawarkan 4 (empat) skenario kemungkinan pola hubungan sipil-militer di Indonesia ke depan. Pertama, TNI hanya berfungsi sebagai alat pertahanan negara. Pada skenario ini TNI diorientasikan pada penegakan kemampuan profesionalisme membangun negosiasi dengan “sipil aliran” (diindikasikan pada parpol yang berbasis aliran, seperti nasionalis, agama/Islam dan sosialis) dan koalisi dengan “social origin” (diindikasikan parpol sekuler seperti Golkar yang konservatif, pro status quo dan partai-partai lain yang moderat dan progresif – yang berada di bawah pengaruh sipil aliran) untuk tidak lagi berpijak pada paradigma dwifungsi. Adanya kesamaan visi antara sipil aliran dengan TNI profesional, dapat memberi ruang bagi TNI untuk kembali kepada fungsi utama dan menentukan arah perubahan paradigma TNI sebagai alat pertahanan negara dan “civic mission”, yaitu membantu masyarakat yang tertimpa musibah atau menyediakan fasilitas TNI dalam kegiatan sosial dan kemanusiaan yang bersifat insidental.

Kedua, TNI profesional selain membangun koalisi dengan social origin. Karena masih memiliki masalah trauma politik dan pamor aktornya masih berada di bawah sipil aliran, maka dibutuhkan kerja yang rapi, seni berpolitik yang tinggi, dan koalisi dengan kekuata sipil aliran untuk bisa tampil ke depan. Jika skenario ini mengungguli skenario lainnya, maka TNI akan tetap berada di MPR.

Ketiga, TNI masih mempunyai pengaruh dan peran yang signifikan peran dalam bidang sosial, politik dan keamanan. Untuk tetap bertahan di dalam struktur politik dan sosial, maka TNI harus membangun negosiasi atau koalisi dengan social origin dan sipil aliran agar menghasilkan sinergi (karena kekuatannya berimbang) untuk sharing kekuasaan. Jika skenario ini dapat mengungguli skenario I, II dan IV, maka tidak akan membawa perubahan paradigma TNI.

Keempat, TNI Dwifungsi akan membangun koalisi baru dengan social origin (lebih menonjol dibanding sipil aliran) dan tetap mempertahankan koalisi yang lama yaitu dengan Golkar. Artinya tidak ada perubahan yang berarti kecuali kerangka retorika politik dan TNI tetap mempertahankan status quo-nya dalam kehidupan sosial, politik, ekonomi dan pemerintahan. (Samego: 2000).

Dari keempat skenario di atas, tampaknya masih belum bisa diprediksikan dengan jelas pola yang pas untuk menempatkan hubungan sipil-militer di Indonesia. Artinya, dari keempat skenario tersebut, masing-masing memiliki kans yang sama besar untuk digunakan. Kadang-kadang dipakai yang pertama, terus yang kedua, ketiga atau yang keempat, dan ini terus bergulir sesuai kebutuhan (baca: kepentingan) para politisi maupun pihak militer.

Selama perjalanan panjang hubungan sipil-militer Indonesia, banyak hal yang bisa dilihat sebagai kapasitas dari masing-masing pihak. Untuk itu dikedepankan 3 kasus krusial yang pernah dan masih menjadi “bulan-bulanan” banyak kalangan.

Pertama, mengenai RUU TNI Pasal 19 yang memberi kewenangan khusus (unilateral) pada pimpinan TNI untuk mengerahkan pasukan ketika ia menilai negara dalam keadaan terancam dan melaporkannya kepada presiden dalam waktu 24 jam. Hal ini dikhawatirkan banyak kalangan akan menghambat upaya reformasi karena akan digunakan sebagai alat mempertahankan status quo militer.

Para analis melihat bahwa hal tersebut menandakan munculnya kembali sifat oportunistik militer berkaitan sejumlah peristiwa, yaitu antara lain tekanan internasional menyusul peristiwa pemboman gedung kembar WTC oleh teroris 11 September 2001; pemboman di Bali tahun 2002 lalu yang mengalihkan perhatian pada domestic security; dan ke’taktega’an (berat hatinya) parlemen Indonesia mendepak militer dalam persaingan menuju Pemilu 2004. Sekali lagi, lemahnya supremasi sipil inilah yang diperkirakan memunculkan keberanian militer untuk bisa mengasah taringnya kembali. Bahkan mantan Menhankam Yuwono Sudarsono mengatakan bahwa “memble”nya supremasi sipil dan menjadikannya tak bermakna adalah ke”tidakmacho”an politisi sipil Indonesia ditambah masih melekatnya mental ‘pretorian-guard’ di kalangan korps perwira militer. Bahkan ada juga spekulasi bahwa pasal 19 merupakan langkah kontijensi (contingency measure) militer jika Pemilu 2004 gagal menghasilkan pemerintahan yang “mumpuni”.

Kedua, mengenai kebijakan Presiden Megawati melakukan kesepakatan imbal dagang pesawat militer yang dilakukan oleh Presiden Megawati dengan pemerintah Rusia. Pembelian pesawat tersebut dilakukan karena pesawat tempur milik AU sudah tua, sehingga tidak lagi efektif dan efisien dalam melakukan tugas pertahanan negara.

Hal ini juga menimbulkan banyak kritikan dari banyak pihak yang mempertanyakan kebijakan presiden tersebut yang dianggap tidak memiliki nilai kepekaan terhadap kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara dengan skala prioritas kepentingan. Bagaimana tidak, di saat perekonomian Indonesia yang masih carut-marut, presiden malah membuang-buang dana negara untuk sesuatu yang tingkat urgensinya tidak terlalu signifikan. Bisa dibayangkan, untuk pembayaran 2 Su-27 Flanker, 2 Su-30KI dan 2 Combat Helikopter M135 –yang dibeli melalui perusahaan Rusia ‘Rosoboronoexport’- adalah cash sebesar 12,5 % dari 170 juta dolar AS sebagai uang muka dan sisanya 87,5 % dengan eksport komoditi karet, winyak sawit mentah (CPO), tekstil dan cokelat selama 16 bulan.

Tidak hanya dari kalangan sipil, kalangan militerpun mempertanyakan kebijakan yang mereka anggap tidak konstitusional tersebut. Menurut mereka, dalam UU Tentang Pertahanan dijelaskan prosedur dimana sebelum keputusan diambil seharusnya pihak militer dilibatkan atau minimal ditanya. Secara “lugu”pun kita menduga-duga apakah ‘kritik’ tersebut adalah ungkapan “jujur” ataukah ekspresi kegirangan -yang disamarkan- karena mendapat “mainan baru”. Paling tidak kita bisa tahu sejauh mana politisi sipil kita bisa “tega” melihat taring militer yang mulai tumpul.

Ketiga, mengenai Keppres Nomor 28 Tahun 2003 tentang Status Darurat Militer di Provinsi Nangroe Aceh Darussalam NAD, yaitu pelaksanaan “operasi terpadu” di Provinsi Nangroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD). Praktis sejak diberlakukan keppres tersebut pada tanggal 19 Mei 2003, keseluruhan wilayah NAD diliputi suasana perang.

Sejak sebelumnya, banyak kalangan menyangsikan efektifitas dan efisiensi pemberlakuan Keppres yang sempat ‘tersimpan’ di dalam map presiden tersebut. Kekhawatiran terhadap keterlibatan militer dalam operasi tiga serangkai tersebut terus berlanjut sampai saat ini, yaitu, militer akan terlibat terlalu jauh dan menjadi semakin enggan melepaskan peran non-tempur yang relatif secara ekonomis lebih menjanjikan sehingga mengabaikan misi utamanya, yaitu pertahanan.

Kenyataannya, baru beberapa hari berjalan, sudah sedemikian banyak korban yang berjatuhan, mati ataupun luka khususnya dari kalangan masyarakat sipil, begitu juga kerusakan fasilitas-fasilitas umum.. Anak-anak sekolah menjadi terlantar, tidak bisa belajar dan mengikuti ujian akhir karena tidak gedung sekolah tempat mereka menuntut ilmu telah dibakar oleh sekelompok orang tak dikenal. Keterlambatan antisipasi dari pemerintah darurat militer di NAD ini banyak menuai pertanyaan dan keprihatinan dari banyak kalangan. Bagaimana mungkin tempat-tempat sepenting gedung sekolah tidak diperhatikan? Bagaimana dengan nasib pendidikan anak-anak sekolah yang menjadi terlantar? Bagaimana sih pemerintah? Bagaimana sih TNI?

Kesiapan dan keseriusan pemerintah pusat terhadap kebijakan operasi terpadu ternyata masih sebatas janji, karena kenyataan di lapangan menunjukkan hal yang berbeda. Bukan hanya itu, trauma terhadap pelanggaran HAM oleh aparat TNI juga menjadi momok semua kalangan, utamanya dikaitkan dengan kebijakan penerapan DOM pada masa Orde Baru. Sementara pihak TNI mengatakan bahwa sebelum berangkat ke Aceh semua personil TNI telah ditempa, dikarantina, dan dicekoki aturan-aturan operasi, termasuk di dalamnya mengenai HAM, bahkan setiap prajurit dibekali buku saku HAM. Apakah itu cukup? Ternyata jauh panggang dari api.

Selama pelaksanaan darurat militer di Aceh, tercatat beberapa kali pelanggaran dilakukan oleh prajurit TNI yang melakukan penyiksaan terhadap warga sipil. Pihak TNI, atas desakan dari berbagai kalangan dan upaya “ja-im” (jaga imej), kemudian melakukan proses hukum terhadap prajurit yang bersangkutan. Walaupun telah diputuskan hukum atas pelaku, namun masih kuat ketakutan akan hal-hal seperti itu. Misalnya, “himbauan” terhadap pers dalam peliputannya agar dalam kerangka keutuhan NKRI.

Bukan hanya itu saja, keberadaan Komnas HAM menjadi permasalahan tersendiri bagi militer (TNI). Beberapa temuan Komnas HAM terhadap pelanggaran oleh pihak TNI dibantah secara “emosional” oleh petinggi TNI (dalam hal ini Penguasa darurat militer dan jajaran perwira TNI), seperti misalnya adanya pembentukan milisi rakyat maupun kuburan massal semasa DOM.

Dengan pemberlakuan darurat militer, bisa kita lihat dan pastikan dimana posisi sipil, dimana posisi militer. Sepertinya operasi di Aceh dijadikan oleh militer/TNI sebagai ajang unjuk praktek hasil pendidikan dan pelatihan mereka, dimana mereka harus menghadapi situsi yang dilematis yaitu melawan strategi gerilya yang selama ini menjadi kebanggaan TNI. Dengan perkiraan waktu 3 bulan dan “mungkin” diperpanjang, tentunya biaya yang dikeluarkan tidak sedikit, sementara Indonesia berencana mengakhiri hubungan dengan IMF. Lalu dana dari mana yang dipakai? Apakah rakyat harus lebih mengencangkan ikat pinggangnya untuk hobi para pemimpin politik dan pemimpin militer? Bagaimana dengan agenda reformasi yang semakin tercecer? Dimana ke’peka’an para tokoh yang katanya wakil rakyat, namun ternyata hanya bisa bernyanyi?

Melihat situasi seperti itu, dapat kita perkirakan seperti apa hubungan sipil-militer di Indonesia, khususnya pasca Orde Baru. Setelah sedikit demi sedikit diberangus pada masa pemerintahan B.J. Habibie, kemudian mulai dikebiri pada masa pemerintahan Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), lalu diajak bersanding kembali pada masa pemerintahan Megawati. Megawati yang sejak awal diragukan banyak kalangan –salah satunya karena ia terlalu teguh dengan “silent is gold”nya- akan mampu membawa perubahan pada pencapaian nilai-nilai reformasi. Tidak hanya kapasitasnya sebagai pemimpin yang tidak mampu menunjukka nilai-nilai supremasi sipil, tapi celah-celah yang dibuatnya untuk dimanfaatkan oleh militer telah meretakkan kembali kaca mata demokasi bangsa yang baru dicetak.

Ketaktegaan politisi sipil terhadap militer yang didasari oleh kepentingan untuk mempertahankan status quonya membuat mereka berlomba menawarkan “proposal kompromi” kepada pihak militer. Terlebih berkaitan dengan konstelasi politik nasional menjelang Pemilu 2004, sepertinya kalangan parpol tidak mau mengambil resiko berkonfrontasi dengan militer. Mereka berebut simpati dari kalangan militer yang dianggap masih memiliki kharisma untuk melanggengkan upaya mereka berbagi “kue” kekuasaan politik. Jadi hasil akhir seperti apakah yang bisa kita raih pasca Pemilu 2004 terhadap hubungan sipil-militer, “apakah bisa happy ending ataukah tetap seperti biasanya? Lagi-lagi sad ending.







DAFTAR PUSTAKA

Alfred Stepan, (terj. Bambang Cipto), Militer dan Demokrasi: Pengalaman Brazil dan Beberapa Negara Lain, Jakarta, Pustaka Utama Grafitti, 1999

Arif Budiman, Teori Negara: Negara, Kekuasaan dan Idiologi, Jakarta, Gramedia, 1997

Harian Umum KOMPAS

Harold Crouch, Militer dan Politik di Indonesia, Jakarta, Sinar Harapan, 1996

Indria Samego, Et. Al., Bila ABRI Menghendaki: Desakan Kuat Reformasi atas Konsep Dwifungsi ABRI, Jakarta, Mizan, 1998

Jeff Haynes, (terj. P. Soemitro), Demokrasi dan Masyarakat Sipil di Dunia Ketiga: Gerakan Politik Baru Kaum Terpinggir, Jakarta, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2000

John McBeth, “The Army Plays Power Politics” dalam Far Eastern Economic Review, Jakarta, March 27, 2003

Nugroho Notosusanto, Hubungan Sipil-Militer dan Dwifungsi ABRI, Jakarta, Dephankam Pusjarah ABRI, 1974

----------, Pejuang dan Prajurit: Konsepsi dan Implementasi Dwifungsi ABRI, Jakarta, Sinar Harapan, 1991

Martin Shaw, Bebas Dari Militer: Analisis Sosiologis atas Kecenderungan Masyarakat Modern, Yogyakarta, Pustaka Pelajat – INSIST, 2001

Michael C. Desch, Politisi Sipil vs Jenderal: Kontrol Sipil atas Militer di Tengah Arus yang Bergeser, Jakarta, PT RajaGrafindo Persada, 2002

M. Karjadi, Polisi: Filsafat dan Perkembangan Hukumnya, Bogor, Politeia, 1978

M. Najib Azca, Hegemoni Tentara, Yogyakarta, LKiS, 1998

Robert A. Dahl, (terj. A. Rahman Zainuddin), Perihal Demokrasi: Menjelajah Teori dan Praktek Demokrasi Secara Singkat, Jakarta, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2001

Rivai Nur dkk., Saatnya Militer Keluar dari Kancah Politik, Jakarta, PSPK, 2000

Samuel P. Huntington, “Mereformasi Hubungan Sipil-Militer ” dalam Larry Diamond dan Marc F. Plattner (ed), Hubungan Sipil-Militer dan Konsolidasi Demokrasi, Jakarta, Rajawali Press, 2000

Ulf Sundhaussen, Politik Militer Indonesia 1945-1967: Menuju Dwi Fungsi ABRI, Jakarta, LP3ES, 1988 (Cet. II)

militer, pemerintah, dan masyarakat sipil

MILITER, PEMERINTAH dan MASYARAKAT SIPIL


( Peran dan Posisi dalam sebuah Negara )





Kalau ada pertanyaan manakah yang lebih penting dari tiga komponen diatas dalam sebuah negara? Tentu ketiganya sama pentingnya. Premisnya, militer, pemerintah dan warga masyarakat, instrumen yang diwajibkan hadir dalam negara. Tentu, ini hanya menjadi beberapa bagian terpenting, dari sekian banyak instrumen yang memang harus ada dalam sebuah negara.

Interaksi ketiga instrumen ini eksistensinya memainkan peran dan fungsinya. Jaminan keseimbangan perjalanan negara ini sangat terletak pada trust mutualisme (saling pengertian) tiga komponen yang terlihat terpisah, namun saling mengait, seperti lingkaran yang tidak terpisahkan.

Lebih jauh penyempurnaan gerak menuju tatanan yang demokratis, ketiga komponen dituntut memainkan peran profesionalismenya. Militer berfungsi sebagai alat negara dalam rangka menjaga kedaulatan dan integritas bangsa dari ancaman luar maupun dalam negeri. Pemerintah berkewajiban melaksanakan kebijakan yang mengatur seluruh kepentingan publik, dengan pedoman norma perangkat aturan yang terlegislasi.

Selanjutnya, untuk melahirkan balance kedua peran instrumen di atas, diperlukan kontrol. Disinlah posisi masyarakat sipil harus berperan. Ini dimaksudkan agar militer dan pemerintah yang berkuasa secara struktural dan memiliki hak otonom dan otoritas melakukan tindakan koersi (Max Weber), terkendali oleh instrupsi konstruktif masyarakat sipil.

Lantas apa jadinya jika tiga komponen tersebut di atas sudah tidak berfungsi dengan baik atau basic peran dan tugas menyimpang dari yang semestinya. Seperti yang telah dikemukan pada bahasan sebelumnya, profesionalisme peran ketiganya jaminan stabilnya eksistensi negara. Jika terdapat salah satu diantaranya yang meyimpang, maka kepincangan dipastikan terjadi. Destabilisasi politik menjadi bagian ancaman yang inklusif.

Misalnya, militer mengintervensi peran politik yang semestinya dijalankan oleh pemerintahan sipil. Atau militer dijadikan watch dog (anjing penjaga) kekuasaan untuk mengintimidasi dan menundukkan kepatuhan masyarakat (pelanggengan kekuasaan pemerintah yang berkuasa).

Selain itu peran pemerintah tidak bisa membedakan batasan wewanangnya, terlibat sangat jauh memasuki ruang-ruang peran dan inisatif yang menjadi bagian militer. Dan hanya terkonsentrasi pada benturan kepentingan perebutan kekuasaan.

Pada konteks ini, masyarakat sipil mau tidak mau akan terposisikan pada pojok yang termajinalkan. Bergejolak pada level yang variatif. Bersikap pasif, skeptis, dan melakukan perlawanan pembangkangan sipil. Konfigurasi gerakan perlawanan ini, mungkin, muncul dalam bentuk motif yang beragam, misalnya mencari alternatif penyaluran apresiasi, jalan dan trotoar menjadi wadah penyampaian aspirasi, bahkan tidakjarang hadir dalam bentuk manifes yang radikal.

Dalam bentuknya yang ‘ekslusif’, pembangkangan sipil ini dapat berupa pembentukan lembaga-lembaga baru bergaya militer untuk bermain peran sebagai penjaga keamanan. Pertanyaannya kemudian, apa yang akan terjadi degan negara tersebut?

Agus Surata dan Tuhana Taufiq A dalam bukunya, Runtuhnya Negara Bangsa menyebutkan bahwa salah satu ciri atau tanda-tanda kehancuran sebuah bangsa adalah “keluarnya negara tersebut dari jalur rel”. Sebuah negara keluar dari jalur rel apabila sebagian besar elemen-elemen yang dimiliki sebuah negara sudah tidak menjalankan peran sebagaimana mestinya. Mereka saling bertikai untuk merebut pengaruh dan wewenang sehingga semuanya ingin berkuasa dan memerintah dalam sebuah negara.

Apabila ini terjadi maka sudah dipastikan yang keluar sebagai pemenang adalah militer, karena selain memiliki senjata dan alat-alat tempur yang menakutkan mereka juga memiliki organisasi yang solid dan terorganisir, sehingga diyakini tidak akan ada yang berani untuk melawannya.

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Di negara modern yang demokratis, peran militer/tentara dibatasi pada pelaksanaan pemerintah dibidang pertahanan nasional dan dalam keadaan darurat keamanan dalam negeri. Yang berhak mengeluarkan perintah kepada militer adalah pemerintah yang dipilih oleh rakyat dalam pemilihan demokratis, yaitu yang dilakukan secara umum, bebas dan rahasia. Kekuasaan pemerintah pilihan rakyat diatas militer dikenal dengan istilah supremasi sipil.

Kondisi darurat ditentukan oleh undang-undang dan peraturan yang rinci. Penyusunan organisasi dan kebijakan militer, termasuk pengangkatan dan penempatan perwira, juga ditetapkan oleh undang-undang. Pemerintah tidak berhak mencampuri hal-hal yang menjadi bagian dari organisasi atau kebijakan internal militer, yang menyangkut profesi ketentaraan, sebagaimana tentara tidak berhak mencampuri hal-hal diluar tugasnya, seperti berpolitik dalam sebuah negara.

Peran pemerintah selain mengatur keberadaan militer, melalui perangkat aturan yang tidak kalah pentingnya adalah memberikan pelayanan kepada masyarakat. Pemerintah dituntut untuk dapat menciptakan kesejahteraan bagi rakyatnya, sehingga apa yang kita inginkan sebuah masyarakat madani dapat terwujut. Disini posisi pemerintah memang berada diatas militer dan masyarakat sipil, karena memang diatas pundak merekalah masa depan sebuah negara ditentukan.

Kolaborasi hubungan yang harmonis antara tiga komponan tersebut diatas memang sangat diperlukan dalam sebuah negara, lebih – lebih negara yang menggunakan sistem demokrasi. Peran dan posisi tiga komponen tersebut harus benar-benar sesuai dan optimal sehingga tidak ada ketimpangan dalam proses jalannya sebuah negara.

Tiga elemen diatas memiliki peran dan posisi yang tidak sama. Militer sebagai alat kekuataan nagara yang berperan sebagai penjaga stabilitas keamanan bangsa harus mampu memberikan keamanan bagi seluruh rakyatnya dari ancaman negara lain maupun kelompok-kelompok bersenjata lainnya. Peran militer ini bisa saja keluar dari profesionalimenya (penjaga stabilitas keamanan internal dan eksternal), misalnya memperbantukan militer terhadap masyarakat yang tertimpa musibah; bencana alam korban banjir, gempa bumi, dll.

Max Weber, dalam bukunya Politic as a Vocation, mengingatkan agar penggunaan kekerasan fisik yang sah (kekuatan militer) oleh negara harus selalu dikontrol melalui seperangkat norma maupun aturan, lembaga, serta praktek-praktek sosial secara terus menerus oleh seluruh komponan masyarakat, sebagai bagian paling hakiki dari demokrasi dalam suatu negara.

Peringatan Weber itu memang beralasan mengingat militer/tentara sebagai sarana bagi penggunaan kekerasan yang sah, sering menyimpang dari tujuan awalnya. Atas nama tugas mengamankan negara, militer melakukan berbagai tindakan kekerasan, teror, penculikan, dan pembunuhan terhadap rakyatnya sendiri.

Di negara-negara rezim otoritarian praksis kekerasan tentara semacam ini banyak terjadi (baca; Indonesia pada masa pemerintahan Orde Baru). Penggunaan wewenang dengan kekerasan ini sudah menjadi hal biasa dilakukan militer, sehingga sering kita dengar tindakan-tindakan militer yang berlebihan dalam menjalankan tugasnya.

Cerminan realitas ini dapat dilihat di berbagai wilayah konflik Indonesia, seperti Aceh, Papua, Timika, dan beberapa daerah lainnya. Kekerasan di wilayah tersebut, seolah menjadi sesuatu yang ‘wajib’ dilumrahkan oleh justifikasi militer yang berlindung di balik tameng demi menjaga stabilitas dan integritas negara. Akan tetapi sesungguhnya, represif (irational approach), kekerasan hanya akan melahirkan aksi kontra kekerasan yang membias lahirnya masalah baru yang lebih rumit seperti yang dihadapi negara pada saat ini.

Paradigma kekerasan militer, tidak populer lagi. Pendekatan kekerasan hanya melahirkan bias masalah yang mengkusut, sulit lagi memilah asasi masalahnya. Karenanya, eksistensi militer dengan paradigma kekerasannya, tidak lagi memposisikannya sebagai stabilisator dan instrumen penjamin pertahanan negara terhadap ancaman eksternal dan eksternal, tapi malah menjadi momok yang mengancam keberdaan negara.

Dari akumulasi wacana yang tergambar di atas, kesadaran posisi ketiga komponen untuk tidak mengintervensi satu sama lainnya (bersifat profesionalisme), dalam hubungan yang harmonis.Ini hanya bisa diwujudkan jika ditumbuhkan kepercayaan dalam melakukan tugas masing-masing untuk menciptakan tatanan demokrasi ideal.

the mission (film)

THE MISSION (Roland Joffe, 1986)

1. Menurut saya, The Mission merupakan film tentang kesetiaan/kepatuhan, pengorbanan, dan pembelaan diri (secara pasif dan aktif) terhadap agama dan hak hidup.
2. Kepatuhan terhadap agama bukanlah sesuatu yang sempit, tidak dapat ditawar ataupun dikompromikan. Kepatuhan/ketidakpatuhan tidak bisa dilihat secara terpisah dari sebab-akibatnya. Bisa jadi ketidakkepatuhan tersebut dilakukan berdasarkan rasionalitas berpikir sebagai upaya pembelaan terhadap agama itu sendiri, sementara dengan kepatuhan membuat penganutnya tidak mampu melakukan apapun. Seperti apa yang dilakukan oleh Gabriel dan Mendoza dengan perjuangan mulia mereka, namun keduanya menempuh jalan yang berbeda, yaitu “kepatuhan” dan “ketidakpatuhan” untuk tujuan yang sama, yaitu “membela agama” mereka. Ketidakpatuhan yang dilakukan oleh Mendoza tidak bisa dikatakan sebagai ketidakpatuhan, karena agama sendiri mengajarkan untuk membela dan menyebarkan ajaran agama. Kenyataan bahwa Mendoza terpaksa menggunakan cara-cara kekerasan, lebih disebabkan sebagai respon balik atas cara-cara (kekerasan) yang digunakan oleh musuh.
3. Secara pribadi, saya lebih condong dengan model perlawanan Mendoza, karena ada hal-hal penting sebagai perjuangan dalam membela agama, misalnya semangat. Dalam agama tidak diajarkan untuk bersikap fatalis atau pasrah, dan agama juga tidak mengajarkan penganutnya untuk membiarkan kesewenang-wenangan atau kemungkaran yang terjadi di sekitarnya. Umatnya dituntut untuk berusaha –sebaiknya bersama-sama- sebatas kemampuannya. Dalam Islam misalnya, bisa dillihat apa dan bagaimana yang dicontohkan oleh Muhammad saw dalam menegakkan dan membela Islam, bahkan Beliau tidak segan (selalu) turun langsung di garis depan memimpin pasukan Muslim di medan pertempuran. Namun, kembali ke film, seperti yang terjadi di akhir, kedua perlawanan yang dilakukan keduanya tersebut dapat dihancurkan oleh musuh, namun meninggalkan kesan-kesan tersendiri bagi penganutnya dan tidak bisa dikatakan gagal.
4. Perang gerilya yang dilakukan oleh Mendoza bukanlah kegagalan dalam menerapkan toleransi dalam kehidupan keagamaan. Pertama, kedua pihak menganut ajaran agama yang sama. Kedua, yang menonjol adalah permasalahan politik-ekonomi di mana bangsa Eropa (Spanyol dan Portugis) merasa bahwa mereka berhak menguasai dan mengatur sepenuhnya daerah jajahan mereka, termasuk merampas kebebasan hak untuk beragama bahkan untuk hidup. Ketiga, karena bernuansa kolonialisme/imperialisme, maka setiap pembangkangan tidak bisa ditolerir dan harus ditumpas secara keseluruhan tanpa kecuali.
5. Menurut saya, komunikasi nonverbal lintasbudaya yang ditampilkan dalam film tersebut cukup berhasil. Dalam komunikasi, komunikasi yang baik adalah yang komunikatif, yaitu masing-masing pihak bisa saling tahu dan paham apa yang dikomunikasikan. Jadi, bahasa verbal bukanlah satu-satunya cara atau alat, bisa melalui tulisan dan bahasa isyarat, seperti dalam Pramuka maupun militer yang dikenal dengan bahasa sandi, misalnya morse dan telegraf.
6. Dalam film tersebut ada dua rejim toleransi, yaitu Multinational Empires dan Immigrant Societies.

nicomachean ethics (aristoteles)

Nicomachean Ethics
By Aristotle
Written 350 B.C.E
Translated by W. D. Ross
Book Vlll
1. After what we have said, a discussion of friendship would naturally follow, since it is a virtue or implies virtue, and is besides most necessary with a view to living. For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods; even rich men and those in possession of office and of dominating power are thought to need friends most of all; for what is the use of such prosperity without the opportunity of beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in its most laudable form towards friends? Or how can prosperity be guarded and preserved without friends? The greater it is, the more exposed is it to risk. And in poverty and in other misfortunes men think friends are the only refuge. It helps the young, too, to keep from error; it aids older people by ministering to their needs and supplementing the activities that are failing from weakness; those in the prime of life it stimulates to noble actions-'two going together'-for with friends men are more able both to think and to act. Again, parent seems by nature to feel it for offspring and offspring for parent, not only among men but among birds and among most animals; it is felt mutually by members of the same race, and especially by men, whence we praise lovers of their fellowmen. We may even in our travels how near and dear every man is to every other. Friendship seems too to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than for justice; for unanimity seems to be something like friendship, and this they aim at most of all, and expel faction as their worst enemy; and when men are friends they have no need of justice, while when they are just they need friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality.
But it is not only necessary but also noble; for we praise those who love their friends, and it is thought to be a fine thing to have many friends; and again we think it is the same people that are good men and are friends. Not a few things about friendship are matters of debate. Some define it as a kind of likeness and say like people are friends, whence come the sayings 'like to like', 'birds of a feather flock together', and so on; others on the contrary say 'two of a trade never agree'. On this very question they inquire for deeper and more physical causes, Euripides saying that 'parched earth loves the rain, and stately heaven when filled with rain loves to fall to earth', and Heraclitus that 'it is what opposes that helps' and 'from different tones comes the fairest tune' and 'all things are produced through strife'; while Empedocles, as well as others, expresses the opposite view that like aims at like. The physical problems we may leave alone (for they do not belong to the present inquiry); let us examine those which are human and involve character and feeling, e.g. whether friendship can arise between any two people or people cannot be friends if they are wicked, and whether there is one species of friendship or more than one. Those who think there is only one because it admits of degrees have relied on an inadequate indication; for even things different in species admit of degree. We have discussed this matter previously.
2. The kinds of friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we first come to know the object of love. For not everything seems to be loved but only the lovable, and this is good, pleasant, or useful; but it would seem to be that by which some good or pleasure is produced that is useful, so that it is the good and the useful that are lovable as ends. Do men love, then, the good, or what is good for them? These sometimes clash. So too with regard to the pleasant. Now it is thought that each loves what is good for himself, and that the good is without qualification lovable, and what is good for each man is lovable for him; but each man loves not what is good for him but what seems good. This however will make no difference; we shall just have to say that this is 'that which seems lovable'. Now there are three grounds on which people love; of the love of lifeless objects we do not use the word 'friendship'; for it is not mutual love, nor is there a wishing of good to the other (for it would surely be ridiculous to wish wine well; if one wishes anything for it, it is that it may keep, so that one may have it oneself); but to a friend we say we ought to wish what is good for his sake. But to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated; goodwill when it is reciprocal being friendship. Or must we add 'when it is recognized'? For many people have goodwill to those whom they have not seen but judge to be good or useful; and one of these might return this feeling. These people seem to bear goodwill to each other; but how could one call them friends when they do not know their mutual feelings? To be friends, then, the must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each other for one of the aforesaid reasons.
3. Now these reasons differ from each other in kind; so, therefore, do the corresponding forms of love and friendship. There are therefore three kinds of friendship, equal in number to the things that are lovable; for with respect to each there is a mutual and recognized love, and those who love each other wish well to each other in that respect in which they love one another. Now those who love each other for their utility do not love each other for themselves but in virtue of some good which they get from each other. So too with those who love for the sake of pleasure; it is not for their character that men love ready-witted people, but because they find them pleasant. Therefore those who love for the sake of utility love for the sake of what is good for themselves, and those who love for the sake of pleasure do so for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves, and not in so far as the other is the person loved but in so far as he is useful or pleasant. And thus these friendships are only incidental; for it is not as being the man he is that the loved person is loved, but as providing some good or pleasure. Such friendships, then, are easily dissolved, if the parties do not remain like themselves; for if the one party is no longer pleasant or useful the other ceases to love him.
Now the useful is not permanent but is always changing. Thus when the motive of the friendship is done away, the friendship is dissolved, inasmuch as it existed only for the ends in question. This kind of friendship seems to exist chiefly between old people (for at that age people pursue not the pleasant but the useful) and, of those who are in their prime or young, between those who pursue utility. And such people do not live much with each other either; for sometimes they do not even find each other pleasant; therefore they do not need such companionship unless they are useful to each other; for they are pleasant to each other only in so far as they rouse in each other hopes of something good to come. Among such friendships people also class the friendship of a host and guest. On the other hand the friendship of young people seems to aim at pleasure; for they live under the guidance of emotion, and pursue above all what is pleasant to themselves and what is immediately before them; but with increasing age their pleasures become different. This is why they quickly become friends and quickly cease to be so; their friendship changes with the object that is found pleasant, and such pleasure alters quickly. Young people are amorous too; for the greater part of the friendship of love depends on emotion and aims at pleasure; this is why they fall in love and quickly fall out of love, changing often within a single day. But these people do wish to spend their days and lives together; for it is thus that they attain the purpose of their friendship.
Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good themselves. Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of own nature and not incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as long as they are good-and goodness is an enduring thing. And each is good without qualification and to his friend, for the good are both good without qualification and useful to each other. So too they are pleasant; for the good are pleasant both without qualification and to each other, since to each his own activities and others like them are pleasurable, and the actions of the good are the same or like. And such a friendship is as might be expected permanent, since there meet in it all the qualities that friends should have. For all friendship is for the sake of good or of pleasure-good or pleasure either in the abstract or such as will be enjoyed by him who has the friendly feeling-and is based on a certain resemblance; and to a friendship of good men all the qualities we have named belong in virtue of the nature of the friends themselves; for in the case of this kind of friendship the other qualities also are alike in both friends, and that which is good without qualification is also without qualification pleasant, and these are the most lovable qualities. Love and friendship therefore are found most and in their best form between such men.
But it is natural that such friendships should be infrequent; for such men are rare. Further, such friendship requires time and familiarity; as the proverb says, men cannot know each other till they have 'eaten salt together'; nor can they admit each other to friendship or be friends till each has been found lovable and been trusted by each. Those who quickly show the marks of friendship to each other wish to be friends, but are not friends unless they both are lovable and know the fact; for a wish for friendship may arise quickly, but friendship does not.
4. This kind of friendship, then, is perfect both in respect of duration and in all other respects, and in it each gets from each in all respects the same as, or something like what, he gives; which is what ought to happen between friends. Friendship for the sake of pleasure bears a resemblance to this kind; for good people too are pleasant to each other. So too does friendship for the sake of utility; for the good are also useful to each other. Among men of these inferior sorts too, friendships are most permanent when the friends get the same thing from each other (e.g. pleasure), and not only that but also from the same source, as happens between readywitted people, not as happens between lover and beloved. For these do not take pleasure in the same things, but the one in seeing the beloved and the other in receiving attentions from his lover; and when the bloom of youth is passing the friendship sometimes passes too (for the one finds no pleasure in the sight of the other, and the other gets no attentions from the first); but many lovers on the other hand are constant, if familiarity has led them to love each other's characters, these being alike. But those who exchange not pleasure but utility in their amour are both less truly friends and less constant. Those who are friends for the sake of utility part when the advantage is at an end; for they were lovers not of each other but of profit.
For the sake of pleasure or utility, then, even bad men may be friends of each other, or good men of bad, or one who is neither good nor bad may be a friend to any sort of person, but for their own sake clearly only good men can be friends; for bad men do not delight in each other unless some advantage come of the relation.
The friendship of the good too and this alone is proof against slander; for it is not easy to trust any one talk about a man who has long been tested by oneself; and it is among good men that trust and the feeling that 'he would never wrong me' and all the other things that are demanded in true friendship are found. In the other kinds of friendship, however, there is nothing to prevent these evils arising. For men apply the name of friends even to those whose motive is utility, in which sense states are said to be friendly (for the alliances of states seem to aim at advantage), and to those who love each other for the sake of pleasure, in which sense children are called friends. Therefore we too ought perhaps to call such people friends, and say that there are several kinds of friendship-firstly and in the proper sense that of good men qua good, and by analogy the other kinds; for it is in virtue of something good and something akin to what is found in true friendship that they are friends, since even the pleasant is good for the lovers of pleasure. But these two kinds of friendship are not often united, nor do the same people become friends for the sake of utility and of pleasure; for things that are only incidentally connected are not often coupled together.
Friendship being divided into these kinds, bad men will be friends for the sake of pleasure or of utility, being in this respect like each other, but good men will be friends for their own sake, i.e. in virtue of their goodness. These, then, are friends without qualification; the others are friends incidentally and through a resemblance to these.
5. As in regard to the virtues some men are called good in respect of a state of character, others in respect of an activity, so too in the case of friendship; for those who live together delight in each other and confer benefits on each other, but those who are asleep or locally separated are not performing, but are disposed to perform, the activities of friendship; distance does not break off the friendship absolutely, but only the activity of it. But if the absence is lasting, it seems actually to make men forget their friendship; hence the saying 'out of sight, out of mind'. Neither old people nor sour people seem to make friends easily; for there is little that is pleasant in them, and no one can spend his days with one whose company is painful, or not pleasant, since nature seems above all to avoid the painful and to aim at the pleasant. Those, however, who approve of each other but do not live together seem to be well-disposed rather than actual friends. For there is nothing so characteristic of friends as living together (since while it people who are in need that desire benefits, even those who are supremely happy desire to spend their days together; for solitude suits such people least of all); but people cannot live together if they are not pleasant and do not enjoy the same things, as friends who are companions seem to do.
The truest friendship, then, is that of the good, as we have frequently said; for that which is without qualification good or pleasant seems to be lovable and desirable, and for each person that which is good or pleasant to him; and the good man is lovable and desirable to the good man for both these reasons. Now it looks as if love were a feeling, friendship a state of character; for love may be felt just as much towards lifeless things, but mutual love involves choice and choice springs from a state of character; and men wish well to those whom they love, for their sake, not as a result of feeling but as a result of a state of character. And in loving a friend men love what is good for themselves; for the good man in becoming a friend becomes a good to his friend. Each, then, both loves what is good for himself, and makes an equal return in goodwill and in pleasantness; for friendship is said to be equality, and both of these are found most in the friendship of the good.
6. Between sour and elderly people friendship arises less readily, inasmuch as they are less good-tempered and enjoy companionship less; for these are thou to be the greatest marks of friendship productive of it. This is why, while men become friends quickly, old men do not; it is because men do not become friends with those in whom they do not delight; and similarly sour people do not quickly make friends either. But such men may bear goodwill to each other; for they wish one another well and aid one another in need; but they are hardly friends because they do not spend their days together nor delight in each other, and these are thought the greatest marks of friendship.
One cannot be a friend to many people in the sense of having friendship of the perfect type with them, just as one cannot be in love with many people at once (for love is a sort of excess of feeling, and it is the nature of such only to be felt towards one person); and it is not easy for many people at the same time to please the same person very greatly, or perhaps even to be good in his eyes. One must, too, acquire some experience of the other person and become familiar with him, and that is very hard. But with a view to utility or pleasure it is possible that many people should please one; for many people are useful or pleasant, and these services take little time.
Of these two kinds that which is for the sake of pleasure is the more like friendship, when both parties get the same things from each other and delight in each other or in the things, as in the friendships of the young; for generosity is more found in such friendships. Friendship based on utility is for the commercially minded. People who are supremely happy, too, have no need of useful friends, but do need pleasant friends; for they wish to live with some one and, though they can endure for a short time what is painful, no one could put up with it continuously, nor even with the Good itself if it were painful to him; this is why they look out for friends who are pleasant. Perhaps they should look out for friends who, being pleasant, are also good, and good for them too; for so they will have all the characteristics that friends should have.
People in positions of authority seem to have friends who fall into distinct classes; some people are useful to them and others are pleasant, but the same people are rarely both; for they seek neither those whose pleasantness is accompanied by virtue nor those whose utility is with a view to noble objects, but in their desire for pleasure they seek for ready-witted people, and their other friends they choose as being clever at doing what they are told, and these characteristics are rarely combined. Now we have said that the good man is at the same time pleasant and useful; but such a man does not become the friend of one who surpasses him in station, unless he is surpassed also in virtue; if this is not so, he does not establish equality by being proportionally exceeded in both respects. But people who surpass him in both respects are not so easy to find.
However that may be, the aforesaid friendships involve equality; for the friends get the same things from one another and wish the same things for one another, or exchange one thing for another, e.g. pleasure for utility; we have said, however, that they are both less truly friendships and less permanent.

But it is from their likeness and their unlikeness to the same thing that they are thought both to be and not to be friendships. It is by their likeness to the friendship of virtue that they seem to be friendships (for one of them involves pleasure and the other utility, and these characteristics belong to the friendship of virtue as well); while it is because the friendship of virtue is proof against slander and permanent, while these quickly change (besides differing from the former in many other respects), that they appear not to be friendships; i.e. it is because of their unlikeness to the friendship of virtue.
7. But there is another kind of friendship, viz. that which involves an inequality between the parties, e.g. that of father to son and in general of elder to younger, that of man to wife and in general that of ruler to subject. And these friendships differ also from each other; for it is not the same that exists between parents and children and between rulers and subjects, nor is even that of father to son the same as that of son to father, nor that of husband to wife the same as that of wife to husband. For the virtue and the function of each of these is different, and so are the reasons for which they love; the love and the friendship are therefore different also. Each party, then, neither gets the same from the other, nor ought to seek it; but when children render to parents what they ought to render to those who brought them into the world, and parents render what they should to their children, the friendship of such persons will be abiding and excellent. In all friendships implying inequality the love also should be proportional, i.e. the better should be more loved than he loves, and so should the more useful, and similarly in each of the other cases; for when the love is in proportion to the merit of the parties, then in a sense arises equality, which is certainly held to be characteristic of friendship.
But equality does not seem to take the same form in acts of justice and in friendship; for in acts of justice what is equal in the primary sense is that which is in proportion to merit, while quantitative equality is secondary, but in friendship quantitative equality is primary and proportion to merit secondary. This becomes clear if there is a great interval in respect of virtue or vice or wealth or anything else between the parties; for then they are no longer friends, and do not even expect to be so. And this is most manifest in the case of the gods; for they surpass us most decisively in all good things. But it is clear also in the case of kings; for with them, too, men who are much their inferiors do not expect to be friends; nor do men of no account expect to be friends with the best or wisest men. In such cases it is not possible to define exactly up to what point friends can remain friends; for much can be taken away and friendship remain, but when one party is removed to a great distance, as God is, the possibility of friendship ceases. This is in fact the origin of the question whether friends really wish for their friends the greatest goods, e.g. that of being gods; since in that case their friends will no longer be friends to them, and therefore will not be good things for them (for friends are good things). The answer is that if we were right in saying that friend wishes good to friend for his sake, his friend must remain the sort of being he is, whatever that may be; therefore it is for him oily so long as he remains a man that he will wish the greatest goods. But perhaps not all the greatest goods; for it is for himself most of all that each man wishes what is good.
8. Most people seem, owing to ambition, to wish to be loved rather than to love; which is why most men love flattery; for the flatterer is a friend in an inferior position, or pretends to be such and to love more than he is loved; and being loved seems to be akin to being honoured, and this is what most people aim at. But it seems to be not for its own sake that people choose honour, but incidentally. For most people enjoy being honoured by those in positions of authority because of their hopes (for they think that if they want anything they will get it from them; and therefore they delight in honour as a token of favour to come); while those who desire honour from good men, and men who know, are aiming at confirming their own opinion of themselves; they delight in honour, therefore, because they believe in their own goodness on the strength of the judgement of those who speak about them. In being loved, on the other hand, people delight for its own sake; whence it would seem to be better than being honoured, and friendship to be desirable in itself. But it seems to lie in loving rather than in being loved, as is indicated by the delight mothers take in loving; for some mothers hand over their children to be brought up, and so long as they know their fate they love them and do not seek to be loved in return (if they cannot have both), but seem to be satisfied if they see them prospering; and they themselves love their children even if these owing to their ignorance give them nothing of a mother's due. Now since friendship depends more on loving, and it is those who love their friends that are praised, loving seems to be the characteristic virtue of friends, so that it is only those in whom this is found in due measure that are lasting friends, and only their friendship that endures.
It is in this way more than any other that even unequals can be friends; they can be equalized. Now equality and likeness are friendship, and especially the likeness of those who are like in virtue; for being steadfast in themselves they hold fast to each other, and neither ask nor give base services, but (one may say) even prevent them; for it is characteristic of good men neither to go wrong themselves nor to let their friends do so. But wicked men have no steadfastness (for they do not remain even like to themselves), but become friends for a short time because they delight in each other's wickedness. Friends who are useful or pleasant last longer; i.e. as long as they provide each other with enjoyments or advantages. Friendship for utility's sake seems to be that which most easily exists between contraries, e.g. between poor and rich, between ignorant and learned; for what a man actually lacks he aims at, and one gives something else in return. But under this head, too, might bring lover and beloved, beautiful and ugly. This is why lovers sometimes seem ridiculous, when they demand to be loved as they love; if they are equally lovable their claim can perhaps be justified, but when they have nothing lovable about them it is ridiculous. Perhaps, however, contrary does not even aim at contrary by its own nature, but only incidentally, the desire being for what is intermediate; for that is what is good, e.g. it is good for the dry not to become wet but to come to the intermediate state, and similarly with the hot and in all other cases. These subjects we may dismiss; for they are indeed somewhat foreign to our inquiry.
9. Friendship and justice seem, as we have said at the outset of our discussion, to be concerned with the same objects and exhibited between the same persons. For in every community there is thought to be some form of justice, and friendship too; at least men address as friends their fellow-voyagers and fellowsoldiers, and so too those associated with them in any other kind of community. And the extent of their association is the extent of their friendship, as it is the extent to which justice exists between them. And the proverb 'what friends have is common property' expresses the truth; for friendship depends on community. Now brothers and comrades have all things in common, but the others to whom we have referred have definite things in common-some more things, others fewer; for of friendships, too, some are more and others less truly friendships. And the claims of justice differ too; the duties of parents to children, and those of brothers to each other are not the same, nor those of comrades and those of fellow-citizens, and so, too, with the other kinds of friendship. There is a difference, therefore, also between the acts that are unjust towards each of these classes of associates, and the injustice increases by being exhibited towards those who are friends in a fuller sense; e.g. it is a more terrible thing to defraud a comrade than a fellow-citizen, more terrible not to help a brother than a stranger, and more terrible to wound a father than any one else. And the demands of justice also seem to increase with the intensity of the friendship, which implies that friendship and justice exist between the same persons and have an equal extension.
Now all forms of community are like parts of the political community; for men journey together with a view to some particular advantage, and to provide something that they need for the purposes of life; and it is for the sake of advantage that the political community too seems both to have come together originally and to endure, for this is what legislators aim at, and they call just that which is to the common advantage. Now the other communities aim at advantage bit by bit, e.g. sailors at what is advantageous on a voyage with a view to making money or something of the kind, fellow-soldiers at what is advantageous in war, whether it is wealth or victory or the taking of a city that they seek, and members of tribes and demes act similarly (Some communities seem to arise for the sake or pleasure, viz. religious guilds and social clubs; for these exist respectively for the sake of offering sacrifice and of companionship. But all these seem to fall under the political community; for it aims not at present advantage but at what is advantageous for life as a whole), offering sacrifices and arranging gatherings for the purpose, and assigning honours to the gods, and providing pleasant relaxations for themselves. For the ancient sacrifices and gatherings seem to take place after the harvest as a sort of firstfruits, because it was at these seasons that people had most leisure. All the communities, then, seem to be parts of the political community; and the particular kinds friendship will correspond to the particular kinds of community.
10. There are three kinds of constitution, and an equal number of deviation-forms--perversions, as it were, of them. The constitutions are monarchy, aristocracy, and thirdly that which is based on a property qualification, which it seems appropriate to call timocratic, though most people are wont to call it polity. The best of these is monarchy, the worst timocracy. The deviation from monarchy is tyrany; for both are forms of one-man rule, but there is the greatest difference between them; the tyrant looks to his own advantage, the king to that of his subjects. For a man is not a king unless he is sufficient to himself and excels his subjects in all good things; and such a man needs nothing further; therefore he will not look to his own interests but to those of his subjects; for a king who is not like that would be a mere titular king. Now tyranny is the very contrary of this; the tyrant pursues his own good. And it is clearer in the case of tyranny that it is the worst deviation-form; but it is the contrary of the best that is worst. Monarchy passes over into tyranny; for tyranny is the evil form of one-man rule and the bad king becomes a tyrant. Aristocracy passes over into oligarchy by the badness of the rulers, who distribute contrary to equity what belongs to the city-all or most of the good things to themselves, and office always to the same people, paying most regard to wealth; thus the rulers are few and are bad men instead of the most worthy. Timocracy passes over into democracy; for these are coterminous, since it is the ideal even of timocracy to be the rule of the majority, and all who have the property qualification count as equal. Democracy is the least bad of the deviations; for in its case the form of constitution is but a slight deviation. These then are the changes to which constitutions are most subject; for these are the smallest and easiest transitions.

One may find resemblances to the constitutions and, as it were, patterns of them even in households. For the association of a father with his sons bears the form of monarchy, since the father cares for his children; and this is why Homer calls Zeus 'father'; it is the ideal of monarchy to be paternal rule. But among the Persians the rule of the father is tyrannical; they use their sons as slaves. Tyrannical too is the rule of a master over slaves; for it is the advantage of the master that is brought about in it. Now this seems to be a correct form of government, but the Persian type is perverted; for the modes of rule appropriate to different relations are diverse. The association of man and wife seems to be aristocratic; for the man rules in accordance with his worth, and in those matters in which a man should rule, but the matters that befit a woman he hands over to her. If the man rules in everything the relation passes over into oligarchy; for in doing so he is not acting in accordance with their respective worth, and not ruling in virtue of his superiority. Sometimes, however, women rule, because they are heiresses; so their rule is not in virtue of excellence but due to wealth and power, as in oligarchies. The association of brothers is like timocracy; for they are equal, except in so far as they differ in age; hence if they differ much in age, the friendship is no longer of the fraternal type. Democracy is found chiefly in masterless dwellings (for here every one is on an equality), and in those in which the ruler is weak and every one has licence to do as he pleases.
11. Each of the constitutions may be seen to involve friendship just in so far as it involves justice. The friendship between a king and his subjects depends on an excess of benefits conferred; for he confers benefits on his subjects if being a good man he cares for them with a view to their well-being, as a shepherd does for his sheep (whence Homer called Agamemnon 'shepherd of the peoples'). Such too is the friendship of a father, though this exceeds the other in the greatness of the benefits conferred; for he is responsible for the existence of his children, which is thought the greatest good, and for their nurture and upbringing.
These things are ascribed to ancestors as well. Further, by nature a father tends to rule over his sons, ancestors over descendants, a king over his subjects. These friendships imply superiority of one party over the other, which is why ancestors are honoured. The justice therefore that exists between persons so related is not the same on both sides but is in every case proportioned to merit; for that is true of the friendship as well. The friendship of man and wife, again, is the same that is found in an aristocracy; for it is in accordance with virtue the better gets more of what is good, and each gets what befits him; and so, too, with the justice in these relations. The friendship of brothers is like that of comrades; for they are equal and of like age, and such persons are for the most part like in their feelings and their character. Like this, too, is the friendship appropriate to timocratic government; for in such a constitution the ideal is for the citizens to be equal and fair; therefore rule is taken in turn, and on equal terms; and the friendship appropriate here will correspond.
But in the deviation-forms, as justice hardly exists, so too does friendship. It exists least in the worst form; in tyranny there is little or no friendship. For where there is nothing common to ruler and ruled, there is not friendship either, since there is not justice; e.g. between craftsman and tool, soul and body, master and slave; the latter in each case is benefited by that which uses it, but there is no friendship nor justice towards lifeless things. But neither is there friendship towards a horse or an ox, nor to a slave qua slave. For there is nothing common to the two parties; the slave is a living tool and the tool a lifeless slave. Qua slave then, one cannot be friends with him. But qua man one can; for there seems to be some justice between any man and any other who can share in a system of law or be a party to an agreement; therefore there can also be friendship with him in so far as he is a man. Therefore while in tyrannies friendship and justice hardly exist, in democracies they exist more fully; for where the citizens are equal they have much in common.
12. Every form of friendship, then, involves association, as has been said. One might, however, mark off from the rest both the friendship of kindred and that of comrades. Those of fellow-citizens, fellow-tribesmen, fellow-voyagers, and the like are more like mere friendships of association; for they seem to rest on a sort of compact. With them we might class the friendship of host and guest. The friendship of kinsmen itself, while it seems to be of many kinds, appears to depend in every case on parental friendship; for parents love their children as being a part of themselves, and children their parents as being something originating from them. Now (1) arents know their offspring better than there children know that they are their children, and (2) the originator feels his offspring to be his own more than the offspring do their begetter; for the product belongs to the producer (e.g. a tooth or hair or anything else to him whose it is), but the producer does not belong to the product, or belongs in a less degree. And (3) the length of time produces the same result; parents love their children as soon as these are born, but children love their parents only after time has elapsed and they have acquired understanding or the power of discrimination by the senses. From these considerations it is also plain why mothers love more than fathers do. Parents, then, love their children as themselves (for their issue are by virtue of their separate existence a sort of other selves), while children love their parents as being born of them, and brothers love each other as being born of the same parents; for their identity with them makes them identical with each other (which is the reason why people talk of 'the same blood', 'the same stock', and so on). They are, therefore, in a sense the same thing, though in separate individuals. Two things that contribute greatly to friendship are a common upbringing and similarity of age; for 'two of an age take to each other', and people brought up together tend to be comrades; whence the friendship of brothers is akin to that of comrades. And cousins and other kinsmen are bound up together by derivation from brothers, viz. by being derived from the same parents. They come to be closer together or farther apart by virtue of the nearness or distance of the original ancestor.
The friendship of children to parents, and of men to gods, is a relation to them as to something good and superior; for they have conferred the greatest benefits, since they are the causes of their being and of their nourishment, and of their education from their birth; and this kind of friendship possesses pleasantness and utility also, more than that of strangers, inasmuch as their life is lived more in common. The friendship of brothers has the characteristics found in that of comrades (and especially when these are good), and in general between people who are like each other, inasmuch as they belong more to each other and start with a love for each other from their very birth, and inasmuch as those born of the same parents and brought up together and similarly educated are more akin in character; and the test of time has been applied most fully and convincingly in their case.
Between other kinsmen friendly relations are found in due proportion. Between man and wife friendship seems to exist by nature; for man is naturally inclined to form couples-even more than to form cities, inasmuch as the household is earlier and more necessary than the city, and reproduction is more common to man with the animals. With the other animals the union extends only to this point, but human beings live together not only for the sake of reproduction but also for the various purposes of life; for from the start the functions are divided, and those of man and woman are different; so they help each other by throwing their peculiar gifts into the common stock. It is for these reasons that both utility and pleasure seem to be found in this kind of friendship. But this friendship may be based also on virtue, if the parties are good; for each has its own virtue and they will delight in the fact. And children seem to be a bond of union (which is the reason why childless people part more easily); for children are a good common to both and what is common holds them together.

How man and wife and in general friend and friend ought mutually to behave seems to be the same question as how it is just for them to behave; for a man does not seem to have the same duties to a friend, a stranger, a comrade, and a schoolfellow.
13. There are three kinds of friendship, as we said at the outset of our inquiry, and in respect of each some are friends on an equality and others by virtue of a superiority (for not only can equally good men become friends but a better man can make friends with a worse, and similarly in friendships of pleasure or utility the friends may be equal or unequal in the benefits they confer). This being so, equals must effect the required equalization on a basis of equality in love and in all other respects, while unequals must render what is in proportion to their superiority or inferiority. Complaints and reproaches arise either only or chiefly in the friendship of utility, and this is only to be expected. For those who are friends on the ground of virtue are anxious to do well by each other (since that is a mark of virtue and of friendship), and between men who are emulating each other in this there cannot be complaints or quarrels; no one is offended by a man who loves him and does well by him-if he is a person of nice feeling he takes his revenge by doing well by the other. And the man who excels the other in the services he renders will not complain of his friend, since he gets what he aims at; for each man desires what is good. Nor do complaints arise much even in friendships of pleasure; for both get at the same time what they desire, if they enjoy spending their time together; and even a man who complained of another for not affording him pleasure would seem ridiculous, since it is in his power not to spend his days with him.
But the friendship of utility is full of complaints; for as they use each other for their own interests they always want to get the better of the bargain, and think they have got less than they should, and blame their partners because they do not get all they 'want and deserve'; and those who do well by others cannot help them as much as those whom they benefit want.
Now it seems that, as justice is of two kinds, one unwritten and the other legal, one kind of friendship of utility is moral and the other legal. And so complaints arise most of all when men do not dissolve the relation in the spirit of the same type of friendship in which they contracted it. The legal type is that which is on fixed terms; its purely commercial variety is on the basis of immediate payment, while the more liberal variety allows time but stipulates for a definite quid pro quo. In this variety the debt is clear and not ambiguous, but in the postponement it contains an element of friendliness; and so some states do not allow suits arising out of such agreements, but think men who have bargained on a basis of credit ought to accept the consequences. The moral type is not on fixed terms; it makes a gift, or does whatever it does, as to a friend; but one expects to receive as much or more, as having not given but lent; and if a man is worse off when the relation is dissolved than he was when it was contracted he will complain. This happens because all or most men, while they wish for what is noble, choose what is advantageous; now it is noble to do well by another without a view to repayment, but it is the receiving of benefits that is advantageous. Therefore if we can we should return the equivalent of what we have received (for we must not make a man our friend against his will; we must recognize that we were mistaken at the first and took a benefit from a person we should not have taken it from-since it was not from a friend, nor from one who did it just for the sake of acting so-and we must settle up just as if we had been benefited on fixed terms). Indeed, one would agree to repay if one could (if one could not, even the giver would not have expected one to do so); therefore if it is possible we must repay. But at the outset we must consider the man by whom we are being benefited and on what terms he is acting, in order that we may accept the benefit on these terms, or else decline it.
It is disputable whether we ought to measure a service by its utility to the receiver and make the return with a view to that, or by the benevolence of the giver. For those who have received say they have received from their benefactors what meant little to the latter and what they might have got from others-minimizing the service; while the givers, on the contrary, say it was the biggest thing they had, and what could not have been got from others, and that it was given in times of danger or similar need. Now if the friendship is one that aims at utility, surely the advantage to the receiver is the measure. For it is he that asks for the service, and the other man helps him on the assumption that he will receive the equivalent; so the assistance has been precisely as great as the advantage to the receiver, and therefore he must return as much as he has received, or even more (for that would be nobler). In friendships based on virtue on the other hand, complaints do not arise, but the purpose of the doer is a sort of measure; for in purpose lies the essential element of virtue and character.
14. Differences arise also in friendships based on superiority; for each expects to get more out of them, but when this happens the friendship is dissolved. Not only does the better man think he ought to get more, since more should be assigned to a good man, but the more useful similarly expects this; they say a useless man should not get as much as they should, since it becomes an act of public service and not a friendship if the proceeds of the friendship do not answer to the worth of the benefits conferred. For they think that, as in a commercial partnership those who put more in get more out, so it should be in friendship. But the man who is in a state of need and inferiority makes the opposite claim; they think it is the part of a good friend to help those who are in need; what, they say, is the use of being the friend of a good man or a powerful man, if one is to get nothing out of it?
At all events it seems that each party is justified in his claim, and that each should get more out of the friendship than the other-not more of the same thing, however, but the superior more honour and the inferior more gain; for honour is the prize of virtue and of beneficence, while gain is the assistance required by inferiority.
It seems to be so in constitutional arrangements also; the man who contributes nothing good to the common stock is not honoured; for what belongs to the public is given to the man who benefits the public, and honour does belong to the public. It is not possible to get wealth from the common stock and at the same time honour. For no one puts up with the smaller share in all things; therefore to the man who loses in wealth they assign honour and to the man who is willing to be paid, wealth, since the proportion to merit equalizes the parties and preserves the friendship, as we have said. This then is also the way in which we should associate with unequals; the man who is benefited in respect of wealth or virtue must give honour in return, repaying what he can. For friendship asks a man to do what he can, not what is proportional to the merits of the case; since that cannot always be done, e.g. in honours paid to the gods or to parents; for no one could ever return to them the equivalent of what he gets, but the man who serves them to the utmost of his power is thought to be a good man. This is why it would not seem open to a man to disown his father (though a father may disown his son); being in debt, he should repay, but there is nothing by doing which a son will have done the equivalent of what he has received, so that he is always in debt. But creditors can remit a debt; and a father can therefore do so too. At the same time it is thought that presumably no one would repudiate a son who was not far gone in wickedness; for apart from the natural friendship of father and son it is human nature not to reject a son's assistance. But the son, if he is wicked, will naturally avoid aiding his father, or not be zealous about it; for most people wish to get benefits, but avoid doing them, as a thing unprofitable.-So much for these questions.

Book lX
1. In all friendships between dissimilars it is, as we have said, proportion that equalizes the parties and preserves the friendship; e.g. in the political form of friendship the shoemaker gets a return for his shoes in proportion to his worth, and the weaver and all other craftsmen do the same. Now here a common measure has been provided in the form of money, and therefore everything is referred to this and measured by this; but in the friendship of lovers sometimes the lover complains that his excess of love is not met by love in return though perhaps there is nothing lovable about him), while often the beloved complains that the lover who formerly promised everything now performs nothing. Such incidents happen when the lover loves the beloved for the sake of pleasure while the beloved loves the lover for the sake of utility, and they do not both possess the qualities expected of them. If these be the objects of the friendship it is dissolved when they do not get the things that formed the motives of their love; for each did not love the other person himself but the qualities he had, and these were not enduring; that is why the friendships also are transient. But the love of characters, as has been said, endures because it is self-dependent. Differences arise when what they get is something different and not what they desire; for it is like getting nothing at all when we do not get what we aim at; compare the story of the person who made promises to a lyre-player, promising him the more, the better he sang, but in the morning, when the other demanded the fulfilment of his promises, said that he had given pleasure for pleasure. Now if this had been what each wanted, all would have been well; but if the one wanted enjoyment but the other gain, and the one has what he wants while the other has not, the terms of the association will not have been properly fulfilled; for what each in fact wants is what he attends to, and it is for the sake of that that that he will give what he has.
But who is to fix the worth of the service; he who makes the sacrifice or he who has got the advantage? At any rate the other seems to leave it to him. This is what they say Protagoras used to do; whenever he taught anything whatsoever, he bade the learner assess the value of the knowledge, and accepted the amount so fixed. But in such matters some men approve of the saying 'let a man have his fixed reward'. Those who get the money first and then do none of the things they said they would, owing to the extravagance of their promises, naturally find themselves the objects of complaint; for they do not fulfil what they agreed to. The sophists are perhaps compelled to do this because no one would give money for the things they do know. These people then, if they do not do what they have been paid for, are naturally made the objects of complaint.
But where there is no contract of service, those who give up something for the sake of the other party cannot (as we have said) be complained of (for that is the nature of the friendship of virtue), and the return to them must be made on the basis of their purpose (for it is purpose that is the characteristic thing in a friend and in virtue). And so too, it seems, should one make a return to those with whom one has studied philosophy; for their worth cannot be measured against money, and they can get no honour which will balance their services, but still it is perhaps enough, as it is with the gods and with one's parents, to give them what one can.
If the gift was not of this sort, but was made with a view to a return, it is no doubt preferable that the return made should be one that seems fair to both parties, but if this cannot be achieved, it would seem not only necessary that the person who gets the first service should fix the reward, but also just; for if the other gets in return the equivalent of the advantage the beneficiary has received, or the price lie would have paid for the pleasure, he will have got what is fair as from the other.
We see this happening too with things put up for sale, and in some places there are laws providing that no actions shall arise out of voluntary contracts, on the assumption that one should settle with a person to whom one has given credit, in the spirit in which one bargained with him. The law holds that it is more just that the person to whom credit was given should fix the terms than that the person who gave credit should do so. For most things are not assessed at the same value by those who have them and those who want them; each class values highly what is its own and what it is offering; yet the return is made on the terms fixed by the receiver. But no doubt the receiver should assess a thing not at what it seems worth when he has it, but at what he assessed it at before he had it.
2. A further problem is set by such questions as, whether one should in all things give the preference to one's father and obey him, or whether when one is ill one should trust a doctor, and when one has to elect a general should elect a man of military skill; and similarly whether one should render a service by preference to a friend or to a good man, and should show gratitude to a benefactor or oblige a friend, if one cannot do both.
All such questions are hard, are they not, to decide with precision? For they admit of many variations of all sorts in respect both of the magnitude of the service and of its nobility necessity. But that we should not give the preference in all things to the same person is plain enough; and we must for the most part return benefits rather than oblige friends, as we must pay back a loan to a creditor rather than make one to a friend. But perhaps even this is not always true; e.g. should a man who has been ransomed out of the hands of brigands ransom his ransomer in return, whoever he may be (or pay him if he has not been captured but demands payment) or should he ransom his father? It would seem that he should ransom his father in preference even to himself. As we have said, then, generally the debt should be paid, but if the gift is exceedingly noble or exceedingly necessary, one should defer to these considerations. For sometimes it is not even fair to return the equivalent of what one has received, when the one man has done a service to one whom he knows to be good, while the other makes a return to one whom he believes to be bad. For that matter, one should sometimes not lend in return to one who has lent to oneself; for the one person lent to a good man, expecting to recover his loan, while the other has no hope of recovering from one who is believed to be bad. Therefore if the facts really are so, the demand is not fair; and if they are not, but people think they are, they would be held to be doing nothing strange in refusing. As we have often pointed out, then, discussions about feelings and actions have just as much definiteness as their subject-matter.
That we should not make the same return to every one, nor give a father the preference in everything, as one does not sacrifice everything to Zeus, is plain enough; but since we ought to render different things to parents, brothers, comrades, and benefactors, we ought to render to each class what is appropriate and becoming. And this is what people seem in fact to do; to marriages they invite their kinsfolk; for these have a part in the family and therefore in the doings that affect the family; and at funerals also they think that kinsfolk, before all others, should meet, for the same reason. And it would be thought that in the matter of food we should help our parents before all others, since we owe our own nourishment to them, and it is more honourable to help in this respect the authors of our being even before ourselves; and honour too one should give to one's parents as one does to the gods, but not any and every honour; for that matter one should not give the same honour to one's father and one's mother, nor again should one give them the honour due to a philosopher or to a general, but the honour due to a father, or again to a mother. To all older persons, too, one should give honour appropriate to their age, by rising to receive them and finding seats for them and so on; while to comrades and brothers one should allow freedom of speech and common use of all things. To kinsmen, too, and fellow-tribesmen and fellow-citizens and to every other class one should always try to assign what is appropriate, and to compare the claims of each class with respect to nearness of relation and to virtue or usefulness. The comparison is easier when the persons belong to the same class, and more laborious when they are different. Yet we must not on that account shrink from the task, but decide the question as best we can.
3. Another question that arises is whether friendships should or should not be broken off when the other party does not remain the same. Perhaps we may say that there is nothing strange in breaking off a friendship based on utility or pleasure, when our friends no longer have these attributes. For it was of these attributes that we were the friends; and when these have failed it is reasonable to love no longer. But one might complain of another if, when he loved us for our usefulness or pleasantness, he pretended to love us for our character. For, as we said at the outset, most differences arise between friends when they are not friends in the spirit in which they think they are. So when a man has deceived himself and has thought he was being loved for his character, when the other person was doing nothing of the kind, he must blame himself; when he has been deceived by the pretences of the other person, it is just that he should complain against his deceiver; he will complain with more justice than one does against people who counterfeit the currency, inasmuch as the wrongdoing is concerned with something more valuable.
But if one accepts another man as good, and he turns out badly and is seen to do so, must one still love him? Surely it is impossible, since not everything can be loved, but only what is good. What is evil neither can nor should be loved; for it is not one's duty to be a lover of evil, nor to become like what is bad; and we have said that like is dear like. Must the friendship, then, be forthwith broken off? Or is this not so in all cases, but only when one's friends are incurable in their wickedness? If they are capable of being reformed one should rather come to the assistance of their character or their property, inasmuch as this is better and more characteristic of friendship. But a man who breaks off such a friendship would seem to be doing nothing strange; for it was not to a man of this sort that he was a friend; when his friend has changed, therefore, and he is unable to save him, he gives him up.
But if one friend remained the same while the other became better and far outstripped him in virtue, should the latter treat the former as a friend? Surely he cannot. When the interval is great this becomes most plain, e.g. in the case of childish friendships; if one friend remained a child in intellect while the other became a fully developed man, how could they be friends when they neither approved of the same things nor delighted in and were pained by the same things? For not even with regard to each other will their tastes agree, and without this (as we saw) they cannot be friends; for they cannot live together. But we have discussed these matters.
Should he, then, behave no otherwise towards him than he would if he had never been his friend? Surely he should keep a remembrance of their former intimacy, and as we think we ought to oblige friends rather than strangers, so to those who have been our friends we ought to make some allowance for our former friendship, when the breach has not been due to excess of wickedness.
4. Friendly relations with one's neighbours, and the marks by which friendships are defined, seem to have proceeded from a man's relations to himself. For (1) we define a friend as one who wishes and does what is good, or seems so, for the sake of his friend, or (2) as one who wishes his friend to exist and live, for his sake; which mothers do to their children, and friends do who have come into conflict. And (3) others define him as one who lives with and (4) has the same tastes as another, or (5) one who grieves and rejoices with his friend; and this too is found in mothers most of all. It is by some one of these characterstics that friendship too is defined.
Now each of these is true of the good man's relation to himself (and of all other men in so far as they think themselves good; virtue and the good man seem, as has been said, to be the measure of every class of things). For his opinions are harmonious, and he desires the same things with all his soul; and therefore he wishes for himself what is good and what seems so, and does it (for it is characteristic of the good man to work out the good), and does so for his own sake (for he does it for the sake of the intellectual element in him, which is thought to be the man himself); and he wishes himself to live and be preserved, and especially the element by virtue of which he thinks. For existence is good to the virtuous man, and each man wishes himself what is good, while no one chooses to possess the whole world if he has first to become some one else (for that matter, even now God possesses the good); he wishes for this only on condition of being whatever he is; and the element that thinks would seem to be the individual man, or to be so more than any other element in him. And such a man wishes to live with himself; for he does so with pleasure, since the memories of his past acts are delightful and his hopes for the future are good, and therefore pleasant. His mind is well stored too with subjects of contemplation. And he grieves and rejoices, more than any other, with himself; for the same thing is always painful, and the same thing always pleasant, and not one thing at one time and another at another; he has, so to speak, nothing to repent of.
Therefore, since each of these characteristics belongs to the good man in relation to himself, and he is related to his friend as to himself (for his friend is another self), friendship too is thought to be one of these attributes, and those who have these attributes to be friends. Whether there is or is not friendship between a man and himself is a question we may dismiss for the present; there would seem to be friendship in so far as he is two or more, to judge from the afore-mentioned attributes of friendship, and from the fact that the extreme of friendship is likened to one's love for oneself.
But the attributes named seem to belong even to the majority of men, poor creatures though they may be. Are we to say then that in so far as they are satisfied with themselves and think they are good, they share in these attributes? Certainly no one who is thoroughly bad and impious has these attributes, or even seems to do so. They hardly belong even to inferior people; for they are at variance with themselves, and have appetites for some things and rational desires for others. This is true, for instance, of incontinent people; for they choose, instead of the things they themselves think good, things that are pleasant but hurtful; while others again, through cowardice and laziness, shrink from doing what they think best for themselves. And those who have done many terrible deeds and are hated for their wickedness even shrink from life and destroy themselves. And wicked men seek for people with whom to spend their days, and shun themselves; for they remember many a grevious deed, and anticipate others like them, when they are by themselves, but when they are with others they forget. And having nothing lovable in them they have no feeling of love to themselves. Therefore also such men do not rejoice or grieve with themselves; for their soul is rent by faction, and one element in it by reason of its wickedness grieves when it abstains from certain acts, while the other part is pleased, and one draws them this way and the other that, as if they were pulling them in pieces. If a man cannot at the same time be pained and pleased, at all events after a short time he is pained because he was pleased, and he could have wished that these things had not been pleasant to him; for bad men are laden with repentance.
Therefore the bad man does not seem to be amicably disposed even to himself, because there is nothing in him to love; so that if to be thus is the height of wretchedness, we should strain every nerve to avoid wickedness and should endeavour to be good; for so and only so can one be either friendly to oneself or a friend to another.
5. Goodwill is a friendly sort of relation, but is not identical with friendship; for one may have goodwill both towards people whom one does not know, and without their knowing it, but not friendship. This has indeed been said already.' But goodwill is not even friendly feeling. For it does not involve intensity or desire, whereas these accompany friendly feeling; and friendly feeling implies intimacy while goodwill may arise of a sudden, as it does towards competitors in a contest; we come to feel goodwill for them and to share in their wishes, but we would not do anything with them; for, as we said, we feel goodwill suddenly and love them only superficially.
Goodwill seems, then, to be a beginning of friendship, as the pleasure of the eye is the beginning of love. For no one loves if he has not first been delighted by the form of the beloved, but he who delights in the form of another does not, for all that, love him, but only does so when he also longs for him when absent and craves for his presence; so too it is not possible for people to be friends if they have not come to feel goodwill for each other, but those who feel goodwill are not for all that friends; for they only wish well to those for whom they feel goodwill, and would not do anything with them nor take trouble for them. And so one might by an extension of the term friendship say that goodwill is inactive friendship, though when it is prolonged and reaches the point of intimacy it becomes friendship-not the friendship based on utility nor that based on pleasure; for goodwill too does not arise on those terms. The man who has received a benefit bestows goodwill in return for what has been done to him, but in doing so is only doing what is just; while he who wishes some one to prosper because he hopes for enrichment through him seems to have goodwill not to him but rather to himself, just as a man is not a friend to another if he cherishes him for the sake of some use to be made of him. In general, goodwill arises on account of some excellence and worth, when one man seems to another beautiful or brave or something of the sort, as we pointed out in the case of competitors in a contest.
6. Unanimity also seems to be a friendly relation. For this reason it is not identity of opinion; for that might occur even with people who do not know each other; nor do we say that people who have the same views on any and every subject are unanimous, e.g. those who agree about the heavenly bodies (for unanimity about these is not a friendly relation), but we do say that a city is unanimous when men have the same opinion about what is to their interest, and choose the same actions, and do what they have resolved in common. It is about things to be done, therefore, that people are said to be unanimous, and, among these, about matters of consequence and in which it is possible for both or all parties to get what they want; e.g. a city is unanimous when all its citizens think that the offices in it should be elective, or that they should form an alliance with Sparta, or that Pittacus should be their ruler-at a time when he himself was also willing to rule. But when each of two people wishes himself to have the thing in question, like the captains in the Phoenissae, they are in a state of faction; for it is not unanimity when each of two parties thinks of the same thing, whatever that may be, but only when they think of the same thing in the same hands, e.g. when both the common people and those of the better class wish the best men to rule; for thus and thus alone do all get what they aim at. Unanimity seems, then, to be political friendship, as indeed it is commonly said to be; for it is concerned with things that are to our interest and have an influence on our life.
Now such unanimity is found among good men; for they are unanimous both in themselves and with one another, being, so to say, of one mind (for the wishes of such men are constant and not at the mercy of opposing currents like a strait of the sea), and they wish for what is just and what is advantageous, and these are the objects of their common endeavour as well. But bad men cannot be unanimous except to a small extent, any more than they can be friends, since they aim at getting more than their share of advantages, while in labour and public service they fall short of their share; and each man wishing for advantage to himself criticizes his neighbour and stands in his way; for if people do not watch it carefully the common weal is soon destroyed. The result is that they are in a state of faction, putting compulsion on each other but unwilling themselves to do what is just.
7. Benefactors are thought to love those they have benefited, more than those who have been well treated love those that have treated them well, and this is discussed as though it were paradoxical. Most people think it is because the latter are in the position of debtors and the former of creditors; and therefore as, in the case of loans, debtors wish their creditors did not exist, while creditors actually take care of the safety of their debtors, so it is thought that benefactors wish the objects of their action to exist since they will then get their gratitude, while the beneficiaries take no interest in making this return. Epicharmus would perhaps declare that they say this because they 'look at things on their bad side', but it is quite like human nature; for most people are forgetful, and are more anxious to be well treated than to treat others well. But the cause would seem to be more deeply rooted in the nature of things; the case of those who have lent money is not even analogous. For they have no friendly feeling to their debtors, but only a wish that they may kept safe with a view to what is to be got from them; while those who have done a service to others feel friendship and love for those they have served even if these are not of any use to them and never will be. This is what happens with craftsmen too; every man loves his own handiwork better than he would be loved by it if it came alive; and this happens perhaps most of all with poets; for they have an excessive love for their own poems, doting on them as if they were their children. This is what the position of benefactors is like; for that which they have treated well is their handiwork, and therefore they love this more than the handiwork does its maker. The cause of this is that existence is to all men a thing to be chosen and loved, and that we exist by virtue of activity (i.e. by living and acting), and that the handiwork is in a sense, the producer in activity; he loves his handiwork, therefore, because he loves existence. And this is rooted in the nature of things; for what he is in potentiality, his handiwork manifests in activity.
At the same time to the benefactor that is noble which depends on his action, so that he delights in the object of his action, whereas to the patient there is nothing noble in the agent, but at most something advantageous, and this is less pleasant and lovable. What is pleasant is the activity of the present, the hope of the future, the memory of the past; but most pleasant is that which depends on activity, and similarly this is most lovable. Now for a man who has made something his work remains (for the noble is lasting), but for the person acted on the utility passes away. And the memory of noble things is pleasant, but that of useful things is not likely to be pleasant, or is less so; though the reverse seems true of expectation.
Further, love is like activity, being loved like passivity; and loving and its concomitants are attributes of those who are the more active.
Again, all men love more what they have won by labour; e.g. those who have made their money love it more than those who have inherited it; and to be well treated seems to involve no labour, while to treat others well is a laborious task. These are the reasons, too, why mothers are fonder of their children than fathers; bringing them into the world costs them more pains, and they know better that the children are their own. This last point, too, would seem to apply to benefactors.
8. The question is also debated, whether a man should love himself most, or some one else. People criticize those who love themselves most, and call them self-lovers, using this as an epithet of disgrace, and a bad man seems to do everything for his own sake, and the more so the more wicked he is-and so men reproach him, for instance, with doing nothing of his own accord-while the good man acts for honour's sake, and the more so the better he is, and acts for his friend's sake, and sacrifices his own interest.
But the facts clash with these arguments, and this is not surprising. For men say that one ought to love best one's best friend, and man's best friend is one who wishes well to the object of his wish for his sake, even if no one is to know of it; and these attributes are found most of all in a man's attitude towards himself, and so are all the other attributes by which a friend is defined; for, as we have said, it is from this relation that all the characteristics of friendship have extended to our neighbours. All the proverbs, too, agree with this, e.g. 'a single soul', and 'what friends have is common property', and 'friendship is equality', and 'charity begins at home'; for all these marks will be found most in a man's relation to himself; he is his own best friend and therefore ought to love himself best. It is therefore a reasonable question, which of the two views we should follow; for both are plausible.
Perhaps we ought to mark off such arguments from each other and determine how far and in what respects each view is right. Now if we grasp the sense in which each school uses the phrase 'lover of self', the truth may become evident. Those who use the term as one of reproach ascribe self-love to people who assign to themselves the greater share of wealth, honours, and bodily pleasures; for these are what most people desire, and busy themselves about as though they were the best of all things, which is the reason, too, why they become objects of competition. So those who are grasping with regard to these things gratify their appetites and in general their feelings and the irrational element of the soul; and most men are of this nature (which is the reason why the epithet has come to be used as it is-it takes its meaning from the prevailing type of self-love, which is a bad one); it is just, therefore, that men who are lovers of self in this way are reproached for being so. That it is those who give themselves the preference in regard to objects of this sort that most people usually call lovers of self is plain; for if a man were always anxious that he himself, above all things, should act justly, temperately, or in accordance with any other of the virtues, and in general were always to try to secure for himself the honourable course, no one will call such a man a lover of self or blame him.
But such a man would seem more than the other a lover of self; at all events he assigns to himself the things that are noblest and best, and gratifies the most authoritative element in and in all things obeys this; and just as a city or any other systematic whole is most properly identified with the most authoritative element in it, so is a man; and therefore the man who loves this and gratifies it is most of all a lover of self. Besides, a man is said to have or not to have self-control according as his reason has or has not the control, on the assumption that this is the man himself; and the things men have done on a rational principle are thought most properly their own acts and voluntary acts. That this is the man himself, then, or is so more than anything else, is plain, and also that the good man loves most this part of him. Whence it follows that he is most truly a lover of self, of another type than that which is a matter of reproach, and as different from that as living according to a rational principle is from living as passion dictates, and desiring what is noble from desiring what seems advantageous. Those, then, who busy themselves in an exceptional degree with noble actions all men approve and praise; and if all were to strive towards what is noble and strain every nerve to do the noblest deeds, everything would be as it should be for the common weal, and every one would secure for himself the goods that are greatest, since virtue is the greatest of goods.
Therefore the good man should be a lover of self (for he will both himself profit by doing noble acts, and will benefit his fellows), but the wicked man should not; for he will hurt both himself and his neighbours, following as he does evil passions. For the wicked man, what he does clashes with what he ought to do, but what the good man ought to do he does; for reason in each of its possessors chooses what is best for itself, and the good man obeys his reason. It is true of the good man too that he does many acts for the sake of his friends and his country, and if necessary dies for them; for he will throw away both wealth and honours and in general the goods that are objects of competition, gaining for himself nobility; since he would prefer a short period of intense pleasure to a long one of mild enjoyment, a twelvemonth of noble life to many years of humdrum existence, and one great and noble action to many trivial ones. Now those who die for others doubtless attain this result; it is therefore a great prize that they choose for themselves. They will throw away wealth too on condition that their friends will gain more; for while a man's friend gains wealth he himself achieves nobility; he is therefore assigning the greater good to himself. The same too is true of honour and office; all these things he will sacrifice to his friend; for this is noble and laudable for himself. Rightly then is he thought to be good, since he chooses nobility before all else. But he may even give up actions to his friend; it may be nobler to become the cause of his friend's acting than to act himself. In all the actions, therefore, that men are praised for, the good man is seen to assign to himself the greater share in what is noble. In this sense, then, as has been said, a man should be a lover of self; but in the sense in which most men are so, he ought not.
9. It is also disputed whether the happy man will need friends or not. It is said that those who are supremely happy and self-sufficient have no need of friends; for they have the things that are good, and therefore being self-sufficient they need nothing further, while a friend, being another self, furnishes what a man cannot provide by his own effort; whence the saying 'when fortune is kind, what need of friends?' But it seems strange, when one assigns all good things to the happy man, not to assign friends, who are thought the greatest of external goods. And if it is more characteristic of a friend to do well by another than to be well done by, and to confer benefits is characteristic of the good man and of virtue, and it is nobler to do well by friends than by strangers, the good man will need people to do well by. This is why the question is asked whether we need friends more in prosperity or in adversity, on the assumption that not only does a man in adversity need people to confer benefits on him, but also those who are prospering need people to do well by. Surely it is strange, too, to make the supremely happy man a solitary; for no one would choose the whole world on condition of being alone, since man is a political creature and one whose nature is to live with others. Therefore even the happy man lives with others; for he has the things that are by nature good. And plainly it is better to spend his days with friends and good men than with strangers or any chance persons. Therefore the happy man needs friends.
What then is it that the first school means, and in what respect is it right? Is it that most identify friends with useful people? Of such friends indeed the supremely happy man will have no need, since he already has the things that are good; nor will he need those whom one makes one's friends because of their pleasantness, or he will need them only to a small extent (for his life, being pleasant, has no need of adventitious pleasure); and because he does not need such friends he is thought not to need friends.
But that is surely not true. For we have said at the outset that happiness is an activity; and activity plainly comes into being and is not present at the start like a piece of property. If (1) happiness lies in living and being active, and the good man's activity is virtuous and pleasant in itself, as we have said at the outset, and (2) a thing's being one's own is one of the attributes that make it pleasant, and (3) we can contemplate our neighbours better than ourselves and their actions better than our own, and if the actions of virtuous men who are their friends are pleasant to good men (since these have both the attributes that are naturally pleasant),-if this be so, the supremely happy man will need friends of this sort, since his purpose is to contemplate worthy actions and actions that are his own, and the actions of a good man who is his friend have both these qualities.
Further, men think that the happy man ought to live pleasantly. Now if he were a solitary, life would be hard for him; for by oneself it is not easy to be continuously active; but with others and towards others it is easier. With others therefore his activity will be more continuous, and it is in itself pleasant, as it ought to be for the man who is supremely happy; for a good man qua good delights in virtuous actions and is vexed at vicious ones, as a musical man enjoys beautiful tunes but is pained at bad ones. A certain training in virtue arises also from the company of the good, as Theognis has said before us.
If we look deeper into the nature of things, a virtuous friend seems to be naturally desirable for a virtuous man. For that which is good by nature, we have said, is for the virtuous man good and pleasant in itself. Now life is defined in the case of animals by the power of perception in that of man by the power of perception or thought; and a power is defined by reference to the corresponding activity, which is the essential thing; therefore life seems to be essentially the act of perceiving or thinking. And life is among the things that are good and pleasant in themselves, since it is determinate and the determinate is of the nature of the good; and that which is good by nature is also good for the virtuous man (which is the reason why life seems pleasant to all men); but we must not apply this to a wicked and corrupt life nor to a life spent in pain; for such a life is indeterminate, as are its attributes. The nature of pain will become plainer in what follows. But if life itself is good and pleasant (which it seems to be, from the very fact that all men desire it, and particularly those who are good and supremely happy; for to such men life is most desirable, and their existence is the most supremely happy) and if he who sees perceives that he sees, and he who hears, that he hears, and he who walks, that he walks, and in the case of all other activities similarly there is something which perceives that we are active, so that if we perceive, we perceive that we perceive, and if we think, that we think; and if to perceive that we perceive or think is to perceive that we exist (for existence was defined as perceiving or thinking); and if perceiving that one lives is in itself one of the things that are pleasant (for life is by nature good, and to perceive what is good present in oneself is pleasant); and if life is desirable, and particularly so for good men, because to them existence is good and pleasant for they are pleased at the consciousness of the presence in them of what is in itself good); and if as the virtuous man is to himself, he is to his friend also (for his friend is another self):-if all this be true, as his own being is desirable for each man, so, or almost so, is that of his friend. Now his being was seen to be desirable because he perceived his own goodness, and such perception is pleasant in itself. He needs, therefore, to be conscious of the existence of his friend as well, and this will be realized in their living together and sharing in discussion and thought; for this is what living together would seem to mean in the case of man, and not, as in the case of cattle, feeding in the same place.
If, then, being is in itself desirable for the supremely happy man (since it is by its nature good and pleasant), and that of his friend is very much the same, a friend will be one of the things that are desirable. Now that which is desirable for him he must have, or he will be deficient in this respect. The man who is to be happy will therefore need virtuous friends.
10. Should we, then, make as many friends as possible, or-as in the case of hospitality it is thought to be suitable advice, that one should be 'neither a man of many guests nor a man with none'-will that apply to friendship as well; should a man neither be friendless nor have an excessive number of friends?

To friends made with a view to utility this saying would seem thoroughly applicable; for to do services to many people in return is a laborious task and life is not long enough for its performance. Therefore friends in excess of those who are sufficient for our own life are superfluous, and hindrances to the noble life; so that we have no need of them. Of friends made with a view to pleasure, also, few are enough, as a little seasoning in food is enough.
But as regards good friends, should we have as many as possible, or is there a limit to the number of one's friends, as there is to the size of a city? You cannot make a city of ten men, and if there are a hundred thousand it is a city no longer. But the proper number is presumably not a single number, but anything that falls between certain fixed points. So for friends too there is a fixed number perhaps the largest number with whom one can live together (for that, we found, thought to be very characteristic of friendship); and that one cannot live with many people and divide oneself up among them is plain. Further, they too must be friends of one another, if they are all to spend their days together; and it is a hard business for this condition to be fulfilled with a large number. It is found difficult, too, to rejoice and to grieve in an intimate way with many people, for it may likely happen that one has at once to be happy with one friend and to mourn with another. Presumably, then, it is well not to seek to have as many friends as possible, but as many as are enough for the purpose of living together; for it would seem actually impossible to be a great friend to many people. This is why one cannot love several people; love is ideally a sort of excess of friendship, and that can only be felt towards one person; therefore great friendship too can only be felt towards a few people. This seems to be confirmed in practice; for we do not find many people who are friends in the comradely way of friendship, and the famous friendships of this sort are always between two people. Those who have many friends and mix intimately with them all are thought to be no one's friend, except in the way proper to fellow-citizens, and such people are also called obsequious. In the way proper to fellow-citizens, indeed, it is possible to be the friend of many and yet not be obsequious but a genuinely good man; but one cannot have with many people the friendship based on virtue and on the character of our friends themselves, and we must be content if we find even a few such.
11. Do we need friends more in good fortune or in bad? They are sought after in both; for while men in adversity need help, in prosperity they need people to live with and to make the objects of their beneficence; for they wish to do well by others. Friendship, then, is more necessary in bad fortune, and so it is useful friends that one wants in this case; but it is more noble in good fortune, and so we also seek for good men as our friends, since it is more desirable to confer benefits on these and to live with these. For the very presence of friends is pleasant both in good fortune and also in bad, since grief is lightened when friends sorrow with us. Hence one might ask whether they share as it were our burden, or-without that happening-their presence by its pleasantness, and the thought of their grieving with us, make our pain less. Whether it is for these reasons or for some other that our grief is lightened, is a question that may be dismissed; at all events what we have described appears to take place.
But their presence seems to contain a mixture of various factors. The very seeing of one's friends is pleasant, especially if one is in adversity, and becomes a safeguard against grief (for a friend tends to comfort us both by the sight of him and by his words, if he is tactful, since he knows our character and the things that please or pain us); but to see him pained at our misfortunes is painful; for every one shuns being a cause of pain to his friends. For this reason people of a manly nature guard against making their friends grieve with them, and, unless he be exceptionally insensible to pain, such a man cannot stand the pain that ensues for his friends, and in general does not admit fellow-mourners because he is not himself given to mourning; but women and womanly men enjoy sympathisers in their grief, and love them as friends and companions in sorrow. But in all things one obviously ought to imitate the better type of person.
On the other hand, the presence of friends in our prosperity implies both a pleasant passing of our time and the pleasant thought of their pleasure at our own good fortune. For this cause it would seem that we ought to summon our friends readily to share our good fortunes (for the beneficent character is a noble one), but summon them to our bad fortunes with hesitation; for we ought to give them as little a share as possible in our evils whence the saying 'enough is my misfortune'. We should summon friends to us most of all when they are likely by suffering a few inconveniences to do us a great service.
Conversely, it is fitting to go unasked and readily to the aid of those in adversity (for it is characteristic of a friend to render services, and especially to those who are in need and have not demanded them; such action is nobler and pleasanter for both persons); but when our friends are prosperous we should join readily in their activities (for they need friends for these too), but be tardy in coming forward to be the objects of their kindness; for it is not noble to be keen to receive benefits. Still, we must no doubt avoid getting the reputation of kill-joys by repulsing them; for that sometimes happens.
The presence of friends, then, seems desirable in all circumstances.
12. Does it not follow, then, that, as for lovers the sight of the beloved is the thing they love most, and they prefer this sense to the others because on it love depends most for its being and for its origin, so for friends the most desirable thing is living together? For friendship is a partnership, and as a man is to himself, so is he to his friend; now in his own case the consciousness of his being is desirable, and so therefore is the consciousness of his friend's being, and the activity of this consciousness is produced when they live together, so that it is natural that they aim at this. And whatever existence means for each class of men, whatever it is for whose sake they value life, in that they wish to occupy themselves with their friends; and so some drink together, others dice together, others join in athletic exercises and hunting, or in the study of philosophy, each class spending their days together in whatever they love most in life; for since they wish to live with their friends, they do and share in those things which give them the sense of living together. Thus the friendship of bad men turns out an evil thing (for because of their instability they unite in bad pursuits, and besides they become evil by becoming like each other), while the friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their companionship; and they are thought to become better too by their activities and by improving each other; for from each other they take the mould of the characteristics they approve-whence the saying 'noble deeds from noble men'.-So much, then, for friendship; our next task must be to discuss pleasure.
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